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Currently, the Department of Defense 000 uses several Precision Landing Systems 
(PLS) including t!-ll: Instruml:nt Landing System t ILS), Automatic Carrier Landing 
System (ACLS), and Precision Approach Radar (PAR). Each system rl:quircs different 
avionics, ground station equipment and are not universally implemented in the different 
sl:rviel:s. This has lead to intcroperability problems among the services. Additionally. 
these landing systems have numerou~ deticiencil:S, which include deployablility, 
manpower requiremems. and frequency congestion. Therefore. a new Precision r .anding 
System is nl:cessary to meet 000 rt:quirl:ments. 
An I:valuation of several different lJifferential GPS systems was performed. This 
evaluation involved a comparison of system capabilities against the requirements 
established by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the 000 requirements. 
The results showed that most Commercial Off 'lbe Shelf (COTS) Differential GPS 
systems meet or exceed the requirements identified by the 000. 
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the end of the Cold \Var has forced our political leaders to rethink our national 
uefense plan, resulting in enOl'llOLIS cuts to the Department of Defense's Budget. [n 
addi tion to the shrinking budget, the Gulf \Var established the fact that Joint Force 
Ooerations is the way future engagements will he fought, requiring interoperability 
between the services which had not been a big concern in the past. To oITset the effects 
of the shrinking budget and the new interoperability requirement, the military is actively 
looking for ways tn exploit readily available commercial technology instead of spending 
enormous amounts of money developing something exclusively for the military or even 
one panicular service. 
Currently, the 000 uses several Precision Landing Systems (PLS) including the 
Instrument Landing System (ILS), Automatic Carrier Landing System (ACLS), and 
Precision Approach Radar (PAR). These systems require different avionics, grOlmd 
station equipment, and are not unlversally implemented in the different services, which 
ha;; lead to interoperability problems heruleen the services. lbis, along with the fact that 
these landing systems have a number of deficiencies. which include deployabilit)', 
manpower requirements, and frequency congestion, has caused the 000 to look for a new 
Precision Landing System to meet these requirements. 
Today, there is an increasing demand for new and improved Precision Landing 
Systems in the civilian world as well as the military, which has contributed to the 
development of Differential GPS. It was not long ago that it had been generally accepted 
that ordinary Differential GPS would not meet the required accuracy perionnance to be 
cenified under the Navigational Sensor Error (NSE) standard used to define the accuracy 
standards for the current Instrument Landing System (ILS). However, with the explosion 
of new technology in Differential Glubal Positioning System~ (DGPS) and with the 
ado;Jlion of the Requin:d Navigation Performance (RNP) concept (or tunnel concept. 
defined in Chapter Jl I) it has become possible to meet the accuracy requirements using 
DGPS. This is the basis for this thesis. which will explore the question: 
Is Commercial OfT The Shelf (COTS) technology in Differential Global 
Positioning Systems (DGPS) capable of meeting the stringent military 
requirements? 
B. THESIS DESCRIPTION AND OBJECTIVES 
Research work in Differential Global Positioning Systems as precision landing 
systems is very popular because of the enonnous potential of the system and the large 
profits possible in developing a new precision approach system available to the entire 
world. Research into automatic landing systems is one of the top priorities in the 
commercial sector. The task of automatically landirig an aircraft on land or the deck of a 
moving aircraft carrier requires very exacting navigation and controL Navigation errors 
that would norrna!ly be considered minuscule become unacceptable or even disastrous 
during an automatic landing. 
This thesis will explore commercial DGPS technology to determine the feasibility 
of using nGPS to satisfy the 000 requirements for its new Precision Landing System 
(PLS). The objectives of this thesis are as follows: 
• Document FAA and 000 requirements for a Precision landing System 
• Determine feasibility of using Commercial DGPS systems in the 000 
C. AIRCRAFT LANDING SYSTEMS 
Aircraft landing systems were developed to allow the safe landing of aireraft under 
adverse weather conditions. Since weather conditions, aireraft avionics, and landing 
systems vary, the Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) has divided landing systems into 
two basic classes: Nonprecision and Precision Approaches. lbe following paragraphs 
further explain and breakdown these classes. 
1. N()npr~cisi()n Approacbes 
An instrwl'.ent approach is considered a nonprecision approach when the navigation 
signal does not provide the aircraft with glide path or glide ~lope infonnmion. The only 
:lavigation information beillg provided to the aircraft is lateral deviation (azimuth) /tom 
intended flight path. A VOR (\'HF Omni-directional Range) or NOB (Non 
Directional Beacon) are examples of nonprecision approach navigation aids. Since there 
is no glide path or glide slope infomation, the minimum deci~ion height is suhstantially 
highcr than a precision approach. A typical VOR Decision Height (DHl is 500 n 
Decision Height refers to the Height Above the Touehdov>1l (HAT) zone. 
2. Precision Approaches 
rhe Jifferenc·e between a nonprecision approach and a precision approach is that a 
precision approach provides glide path or glide slope intonnation. In addition, a 
precision approach navigation aid typically has better lateral accuracy than a nonprecision 
approach. Because of the vast differences in avionics and pilot capabilities from general 
aviatioll to commercial aviation, several different categories ofprccision approaches were 
establi~hed. Please see Table 1.1 for a description of these different categories a!:i defmed 
by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). 
Category Decision Runway Typical User 
Height (HAT) Visual Range 
CAT I 200 ft 1800 ft General/Commercial 
CAT II 100 ft 1150 ft Commercial 
CAT IliA 0-100 ft 660 ft Major Airlines 
CAT IIiB a 50 ft 150-660ft Major Airlines 
CATIlIC Oft Oft Major Airlines 
Table 1.1 PrecIsion Approach Categories Ref. [1] 
a. Category f 
['his is a precision approach with a decision height no lower than 200 ft HAT 
and a Runway Visual Rangl: (RVR) of at kast 550 m. This is the most common 
C<ltl:gory, and typically any aircraft (commercial or general aviation) ccnitied for 
Instrument Flight Ruks (IFR) is capable of this flying this category . 
h. Category II 
This is a prl:cision approach with a decision height lower than 200 ft HAT, but 
no lower than 100 ft HAT and a Runway Visual Range (RVR) of at least 350 m. This 
approach requirl:s the aircraft to have an autopilot, precision decision height 
determination, and auto Ihrottles. Usually only commercia! aircraft are equipped to meet 
these requirements. 
c. Category lilA 
Illis is a precision approach with a decision height lower than 100 ft HAT, or no 
decision height and a Runway Visual Range (RVR) of at least 200m. In addition to the 
CAT 11 aircraft requirements, the aircraft must have autoland capability. Typically only 
major airlines fly aircraft with this capability. 
d. Call!gory TllB 
This is a precision approach with a decision height lower than 50 ft HAT, or no 
decision height and a Runway Visual Range (RVR) less than 200m, but not less than 
50m. In addition to the aircraft requirements for CAT lIlA, roll out guidance is requirl:d 
for Category ruB. 
e. CaJegory fIlC 
This is a precision approach which has no dedsion height or no Runway Visual 
Range (RVR) minimum. The aircraft requirements are the same as CAT f1IB. 
II. GPS AND VGPS SYSTEMS 
Hefon~ describing and comparing the different fonns of Differential Glohal 
PosiLioning System (OGPS), il is necessary to review the wrrenl radionavigation systems 
and 10 '.mderswnd how the Global Positioning System (GPS) works. In this ehapkr, an 
overview of the Global Positioning System, as well as a detailed description of the 
vario:ls ronns ofDGPS, will be presented. 
A. OVERVTFW OF CURRENT RADIO:'Ii"AVIGATION SYSTEMS 
It should be lll1derstDOd that navigation systems are used extensively in many 
aspects of government a.~ well as commercial acti\·itics. In fact, the United States 
government has provided navigation services to the general public for many years, 
especially those activities that support air and marine commerce. 
The civilian sector as .. veil as the military are looking for a Precision Landing 
System (PLS) to meet future requirements, which should include me capability of 
automatic landings. Automatic landings place enormous requirements on the Precision 
Landing System. These requirements include but are not limited to system accuracy. 
nefore starting into Differential GPS, it would be helpful to review several of me 
radionavigation systems mat are currently in operation. They offer various degrees of 
accuracy due to the type of technology they employ as well as their overall age. 
I. GrouDd Based Radionavigation Sy~tem .. 
a. Radiobf'acons 
These are radio transmitting stations that operate in the low to mediwn 
frequency bands. To navigate using this signal, a Radio Direction Pinder (RDI') is used. 
It measures me bearing of the transmitter with respect to the aircraft or other vessel. 
rhere are nwnerous nondin::ctional beacons available, which makes them attractive. 
Howe\'er, me accuracy of these beacons is typically 3 degrees (2 sigma), which translates 
to approKimmely a 0.5 nautical mile error at 10 nautical miles and continues to get worse 
as you (!\ove away from the beacon. While this error may seem large, it has been 
accepted fo r non-precision approaches into many airports. 
b. LORAN-C 
LORAN, short for Long Range Navigation, was originally developed for 
military users. There are approximately 15 LORAN-C chains around the world; a chain 
consists of a master station and two or three slave stations. This is a hyperbolic system 
because the receiver is measuring the difference in distance to two known points, which 
requires the receiver to lie on a hyperbola. with the foci at the two given points. It uses a 
low frequency signal (center frequency 100 kHz) that allows the receiver to calculate its 
position by time difference of arrivaL The wavelength of the LORAN signal is 
approximately 1.6 nautical miles, making very precise positioning impossible. The 
accuracy of the LORAN-C is approximately 0.25 nautical miles, but repeatability 
(returning the exact same spot) is mucll greater, usually between 20-100 meters [Ref. 2, p. 
140 ]. In addition, position updates are available only 10-20 times per minute. This 
system is suitable for enroute navigation and non-precision approaches. However, its 
accuracy does not meet the requirements tor precision approacbes and automatic 
landings. 
c. OMEGA 
OMEGA is a hyperbolic system like LORAl'l, except it uses pllase difference 
measurements instead of LORAN's Time Of Arrival (TOA). This system uses Very Low 
Frequency (VLF) signals in the 10-14 kHz range. The advantage of using VLF is that 
only eight transmitting stations are required to cover the entire earth. A disadvantage of 
VLF is that its wavelength is approximately 16 miles, giving a position accuracy in the 
range of two to four nautical miles. The accuracy of this system doesn't meet the 
requirements for any type of approach. 
d. VOR, VORJDl\llE, T4CA1\' 
VHF Onmi-direetional Range (VOR). Distam:e Measuring Equipment lDME). 
and Tactical Air Navigation (TACAN) providc csscntial guidance for enroute navigation 
within the United States. VOR, VORJDME. and TACAN provide the aircraft with 
bCClring and range with respect to the groWld instaJiation. VOR only provides bearing 
information to the ;>.in:raft. VOR and VOR DME use VI If frequencies in the 112-118 
MHz range with a channel separation of 50 kHz [Ref. 2, p. 162), while TACAN uses 
L-band UHF frequencies Both UHF and VHF signals arc line of sight, limiting the 
effective range to approximately 200 nautical miles at an altitude of 20,000 feet. There 
arc a large number of these systems across the United States. Therefore coverage and 
availability are very good. Bearing accuracy for these systems is approximately 1.4 
degrees, which equates to 0.25 nautical miles at a range of 10 nautical miles. The relative 
and repeatable accuracies arc approximately 0.35 degrees, which equates to 0.063 
nautical miles at a range of 10 nautical miles. The range measuring error is 
approximately 0.1 nautical miles. Position updates are available virtually continuously 
from these systems, and they are very al,;~urate systems. However, they still don't meet 
the stringent requirements for automatic landings. 
e. In.ftrument Landing System 
The Instmment Landing System (ILS) ground system consists of three main 
parts, the localizer giving azimuth infonnation, glide path transmitter giving elevation 
angle, and three markers (outer, middle, and inner markers) giving di~tance infonnation 
as the aircraft passes. This is the current precision approach system used through out the 
United States and most of the world. This system operates in the same VHF frequency 
band as VORfOME. It is fully capable of providing the navigation accuracy required for 
automatic landings. However, tht:re are several disadvantages that make it unsuitable for 
the furure. First, it only has forty ~hannels, which can cause a problem when operating in 
an area wht:re airport density is high. Next, there can be frequency interference with FM 
radio stations using tho: upper part of the fM band. In fact, this is already happening at 
many overseas locations. Finally, the complex antenna arrays used by ILS arc very bulky 
and require level ground several hundred meters in front of the antenna. This can cost a 
great deal of money and makes it wlsuitable for some airports. These weaknesses have 
caused the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to decide that the ILS would 
be replaced by better landing systems. 
J Microwave Landing System 
The Microwave Landing System (MLS) uses a Time Reference Scanning Beam 
system. The so called "to-fro" principle is used to determine an angular measurements. 
Basically, a fan beam is scanned through the approach path. An aircraft receiver can 
dctect this beam as it scans from one side ("to" pulse) then back in the opposite direction 
("fro" pulse). It operates in the 5.03 to 5.09 GHz range {Ref. 2, p. 182]. This eliminates 
many of the problems associated with the ILS. It is extremely accurate and is fully 
capable of providing the navigation signals required for automatic landings. However, 
the United States announced in \-fay of 1994 that the Microwave Landing System win not 
be fully implemented. This was due to the recent developments in Differential GPS 
showing great potential for a cost effective alternative to MLS and that MLS 
development was at least 10 years behind schedule at this JXlint. 
2. Space-Based Radioo8vigatioo 
a. TRANSIT 
TRAi'l"SIT is a satellite system consisting of at least four satellites in 600 
nautical mile polar orbits. 'Ibis system is operated by the Department of the Navy for 
military users, but there are many civil users. It provides worldwide coverage. However, 
due tu the Low nwnber of sate!lites and relatively low earth urbit. this coverage is not 
constant. In fact, the satellites only come into view every 1-3 hours. The system 
transmits on 150 MHz and 400 MHz frequencies. Typical single satellite JXlsition errors 
are approximately 500 meters for dynamic users [Ref. 2, p. 245J. The system was 
designed for maritime users. Therefore. the position updates are too infrequent for air 
navigation of any type. 
h. Global Posiliorrjrrg System 
Tne Global Positioning System WdS developed by the Department of Defense to 
provide 24 hour. worldwide radionavigation service. It consists of 24 satellites in six 
orbital planes each having lour satellites. The satellites transmit on the L\ and L! 
frequencies, which arc 1575 .42 MHz and 1227.6 MHz respectively. 'Ibis system 
providcs twO levels of positioning, the Standard Positioning Scrvice (SPS) and the 
Precise Positioning Service (PPS). The SPS level is available to all users and provides 
100 meter accuracy. The PPS service has been encrypted, making it available only to 
authorized users, and provides 15 meter accuracy. These systems provide adequate 
accuracy for enroute, tenninal and non-precision approaches, However, they are still not 
accurate cnough for precision approaches and automatic landings. 
c. Differential Global Positioning System 
The key to Differential GPS is that the majority of the errors associated with 
GPS are common among receivers that are relatively close. By placing a receiver at a 
known position you can measure the majority of the error in the GPS signal and broadcast 
it to other receivcrs in the local area. Removing these errors makes Differential GPS 
accurate enough for precision approaches and suitable automatic landings. 
Thcre is an increasing demand for Category III precision approach landing 
systems both in the civilian world and the military, It was not long ago that it had been 
generally accepted that ordinary Ditrerential GPS would not meet the requircd acctuacy 
to be cel1ified under the Navigational Sensor Error (NSE) standard used to define the 
accuracy standards for the current Instrument Landing System (ILS). However, with the 
cnonnous explosion in commercial Differential GPS systems and with the adoption of the 
Reqllln:d Navi gation Performancc (R.,'iP) concept (or tunnel concept) it has be<.:omc 
possihle to meet the accuracy requirements using DGPS. 
B. GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM 
fhe Glohal Positioning System is a radio navigation system that is capahle of 
providing continuous global coverage. This system was designed to provide the 
Department of Defense with a radio navigation system that would last well into the next 
century. This is a satellite-based system. The Global Positioning System is composed of 
three principal segments: 
• Space Segment 
• User Segment 
• Control Segment 
Each of these segments will be discussed in the following sections. 
l. Space Segment 
The Space segment consists of the satellite, its orbit, and the signal it transmits. To 
provide continuous global coverage, the space segment was designed with four satellites 
arranged in each of six, 55 degree inclination orbital planes about the earth, for a total of 
24 satellites. 
II- GPSSaJellite 
Each of these satellites is composed of more than 65,000 individual parts. The 
Block II satellite weighs approximately 2,000 lbs and is designed for an on-orbit lifetime 
of 7 112 years which is equal to abom 580 million miles traveled. See Figure 2. 1 for a 
picture of the satellite. The satellite can be broken down into the following eight major 
subsystems [Ref. 31. 
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(I) Orbit injection subsystem. These satellites arc put into an initial parking 
orbit by the McDonnell Douglas Delta II booster rocket. From this initial parking orbit. 
the satellite fires its Pam-D perigee kick motor. The perigee kick motor burns out shortly 
after it has been ignited. Once it has burned out the casing is discarded. Once the 
satellite has traveled 180 degrees to apogee, the apogee kick mOlOr is fired to achieve 
circular orbit. The apogee kick mOlOr is a Star 37-XF solid rocket built by Thiokol. 
However, the apogee motor differs from the perigee motor it that it is pennanently 
affixed to the satellite and contributes to the thermal control system by providing an 
additional absorber and emitter for solar radiation [Ref. 3, p. 130]. 
(2) Attitude and Velocity Control System (see Figure 2.2). The GPS satellite 
is three-axis stabilized. It uses momentwn wheels to maintain the satellite in its proper 
orientation with respect to the earth. This is a(;complished by adjusting the rotation rates 
of the momentum wheels. As attitude ajustments are made, the momentwn wheels begin 
to spin faster and faster. The thrusters and the three electromagnet assembly an:: used to 
counterbalance the force applied to periodically slow the momentwn wheels. 
THE ATTITUDE AND VELOCITY 
SUBSYSTEM COMPONENTS 
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(1) Telemetry, Tra(;king. and Command. This systtm allows the groWld 
control sta::on to taL, to tht: satelli tc. Tilis is accomplisiled via em:rypted signal s in the 
S-hand rd.'1ge. The uplink frequency is I nn.74 MHz and the down link frequen(;y is 
2227.5 MHz. These sig~als have heen designed to he extremely jam rcsistant. The 
uplink iTequency is used to provide updates to the satellite's ephemeris data and clock 
correction factors. Thc downlink frcqucncy is uscd primarily :0 provide the groW1d 
;;tation with admowledgments that the corrections have been received. 
(4) Electrical Power. Uectrical power on board the satellite is generated by 
two large solar cells. These solar provide 78 square feet of surface area, and the cells 
wcre designed so they would provide the satellite with approximately 700 watts ofpowcr 
at the end of the satellite's life. Thc solar panels track thc SUll through the entire orbit. 
However, when the satellite is eclipsed by the earth and operating on battery power, the 
satt:lIite performs a maneuver to unwind the solar panels and internal cables to allow 
them to track tht: sun once again.. Each satellite ha~ three nickel cadmium batteries. 
They store the excess power generated from the soLar cells to provide continuous 
operation when the satellite is eclipsed by the earth. It is very seldom that the batteries 
are discharged below 65% of capacity. 
(5) Navigation System. nus system simply consists of the two cesium and 
two ruhidium atomic clocks onboard the satellite, 'TIlese clocks are responsible for 
gencrating the Coarse Acquisition code (ClAl and the Precision code (P--code) timing 
pulses. Only one of the atomic clocks operates at anyone time. The other three are 
back-ups and are powered up only upon failure. 
(6) Reaction Control System, It is composed of the t\\o"O, tivC-POlUld trim 
thrusters and twenty 0.1 pound attitude control thrusters. lltis system provides all of the 
t:,. V requireu to maintain the proper orbit and attimde if the attittlde control system is 
unable to meet these requirements. All thrusters are hydrarine propellant thrusters. 
Hydmzine is not extremely efticient, with a specific impulse of approximately 220 
13 
seconds. However it was chosen because of its easy storage rl:4uirements and because, 
when burned it produces simply water and anunonia. 
(7) Thennal Control. The electronics and atomic clocks were designed to 
operate at room temperature. Therefore. the thennal control system must maintain the 
internal portion of the satellite at nearly constant temperarure. The satellite has seven 
lhemlOstatically controlled louvers that open and close automatically to maintain a 
constant temperature. In addition to the louvers, goldized mylar-kapton insulation 
blankets are ~pplied. In some places on the satellite. there are up to 13 layers of 
insulation. "According to the thennal experts who masternlinded the spacecraft design. if 
they carefully wrapped a I-pound block of ice in 13-1ayer mylar-kapton insulation 
blanket and placed it on the Santa Monica pier, one year later they would still find ice 
inside!" [Ref. 3, p. 135 J. Finally, there are several resistance heaters placed throughout 
the spacecraft to help maintain the constant temperarure required by the electronics and 
atomic clocks. 
(8) Structure (see Figure 2.3). The satellites are composed primarily of 
aluminum. They use hexagon cells modeled after the bumblebee honeycomb, which are 
bonded with thin sheets of aluminum to provide light weight and very rigid structure. 
b. Satellite Orbits 
There are four satellites in each of the six circuJar orbital planes with an 
inclination of 55 degrees and an orbital radius of 20,200 km. The high orbital altitude 
<lllows for polar coverage, without a polar orbit. The maximum allowed eccentricity is 
0.03 before orbital corrections are made [Ref. 2, p. 273]. The 55 degree inclination was 
initially chosen for two reasons. The ftrst was because the space shuttle was used to 
launch the satellites. The second reason has to do with geometry, because two satellite 
orbits moving in opposite directions intersect at approximately a 90 degree angle. This 
means very good geometry to the user [Ref. 2, p. 2751. 
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STRUCTURAL SUBSYSTEM EXPLODED VIEW 
• RIGID BODY OF ALUMlNU,. 
IIONOI!.D HONEYCOMB PANEL.S 
• MAJOR AXIS SPINNER 
• TWO SINGLE HINGE-POINT 
DEPlOYABLE ARRAYS 
Figure 2.3 Satellite Structure From Ref. [3] 
The orbital period is 12 sidereal hours, which equates to 11 hr 58 min. 
Therefore, the satellite will make two orbits per day. Consequently, the same satellite 
will appear al a given ground location at the same sidereal time each day_ Ibis 
corresponds to the same satellite appearing in the same position four minutes earlier each 
calendar day. Each of these satellites transmits a precisely timed binary pulse train and 
I:phemeris data containing its wrrent orbital elements, Currently there arc 26 salelHles in 
the GPS constellation. Two of these satellites are Block I satellites. Dilly one of them 
still remains in full service. The other 24 are either Block II or Block I1A satellites [Ref. 
41· 
2. User Segment 
The next segment is called the user segment. It simply consists of all the antennas 
and receiver/processors that are capable of providing position, velocity, and preCise 
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t ~ ming to the U~I:r. In order for the user segment to work a minimum of four satellites 
must be in view of the receiver. Remember that the system was originally developed for 
the 000 without consideration for civil use. Therefore the signals available to the 
civi lian liser only provide limited accuracy compared with the accuracy available from 
the encrypted military signals (this will be further explained in the GPS signals 
charackristics section below). It has been the civilianlconunercial sector that has been 
working furiously to develop new and better ways to overcome the civilian sectors 
limited access to GPS signals which has lead to the explosion of new technology in 
Differential GPS . 
3. Control Segment 
Finally, the last segment is called the control segment. Because we don't live in a 
perfect world. satellite clocks tend to diverge from their original settings, and orbits also 
tcnd to degrade. Therefore, they must be continuously tracked and updated. To 
accomplish this there is a master control station, five monitoring stations, and three 
ground antennas. The master control station is located at Falcon Air Force Base in 
Colorado . The five monitoring stations are located at Hawaii, Kwajalein, Ascension 
Island, Diego Garcia, and Colorado Springs. The three ground antennas are located at 
Kwajalein, Ascension Island, and Diego Garcia The monitoring station tracks all 
satellites within its view. They are continuously accumulating ranging information from 
the satellites and retransmitting it to the master control station. The master control station 
uses this data to determine each satellite's precise orbit. Once the orbit has been 
calculated, each satellite's ephemeris data is updated using one of the ground antennas. 
C. GPS SIGNAL CHARACTERISTICS 
Each satellite transmits on tw"o L-band frequencies. The primary frequency is L I at 
1575.42 MHz and L2 is at 1227.6 MHz. The tw"o frequenc ies aHow military users to 
correct for ionospheric errors, which is discussed further in the OPS Errors section of this 
paper. There are three pseudo-random noise (PRN) ranging codes that are being used. 
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fhe first is CoarselAcquisition (CIA) codl: This codc is available only on tbe LI 
fn.:qUl'ncy. The CIA codc is avai lable free of charge to all civilian users in the United 
Statl:s as well as the rest of the world. Thc CIA code has an I:ITor of 100 meters 
horizontally and 140 meters vertically. This includes a random I:ITor called selective 
availability (SIAl lhat iJllentionally degrades the CIA signal to keep the eITor at thcse 
figures with a 95% probability. The main purpose for the Coarse/Aquisition code is to 
providc the military user with all the appropriate information (i.e., orbital elemen\.!;, dock 
behavior. system time) to acquire the Precision code or P-codc. However, with the 
enormous amount of civilian users world wide, the 000 has been forced to recognizc that 
the CIA code is for civilian navigation as well. The CIA has a chipping rate of 1.023 
MIIz and a 1,023 bit message which it continuously repea\.!;. This establishes the 
repetition interval at one onl:-thousandth ofa second [Ref. 3, p. 20]. 
The last two pseudo-random noise (PRN) ranging codes are Precision code 
(P-code) and the encrypted code (Y-code). The V-code is identical to the P-code, except 
it has been cncrypted to restrict access to authorized u.~ers only. lbe P-code is 
transmitted on both the L I and L2 frequencies. The entire P-code has a length of 
approximately 2.4 x 101• bits. With the P-code chipping rate of 10.23 MHz, the P-code 
would repeat after 267 days, which is just ovef 38 weeks. The P-code is broken down 
into week segmcnts and a unique week code is assigned to each GPS satellite. lbis 
allows the satellite constellation to include pseudolites (ground based OPS transmitters) 
to grow to )!I satellites before any changes in P-code assignment would be required. The 
first )2 codes are reserved for actual sateUites, while the remaining codes are reserved for 
pseudolites. All of these codes are initialized at midnight (OPS time) bet",:een Satunlay 
and Sunday. 
Since the P-code doesn't repeat fOf over a week this makes it very difficult to 
acquire this code in a timely manner. lberefore, a two-step procedure has been 
developed for thc receivl:rs. 
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The first step starts when the receiver acquires the sateHile using the much shorter 
CIA code . Once this is accomplished, the receiver can start receiving the GPS data 
stream. The message data is transmitted at a rate of 50 bits/second. The entire GPS 
message takes 12.5 minutes and is composed of 25 thirty second frames. Each of these 
frames is funher divided into 5 six second subframes. Within each of these subframes a 
handover word is transmilted. The handover word contains a set of constants that allow 
the receiver to generate the appropriate P-code. 
Therefore the second step for the receiver is to use the handover word to generate 
the P-code. This allows the receiver to acquire the sateHite in a substantially reduced 
time [Ref. 3, p. 57]. The spherical error associated with the PlY code is approximately 
15 meters. 
The Global Positioning System provides two levels of service. They are the 
Standard Positioning Service (SPS), and the Precision Positioning Service (PPS). The 
SPS is provided to all users worldwide using the CIA code on the Ll frequency. The PPS 
consists of both the P·code and the Y-code and is available on both the Ll and L2 
frequency. However, due to strategic military concerns only the encrypted Y·code for the 
PPS and the CIA code fcr the SPS are continuously transmitted world wide. lltis limits 
PPS service to only authorized users. 
D. GPS TIMING 
The GPS satellites have atomic clocks onboar<! to keep track of time. Each 
satellite has four atomic clocks. Two of the clocks are Cesiwn and two are Rubidium 
[Ref. 3, p. 153]. The GPS system time was initiated on January 6, 1980, at 0000 
Universal Time (UT). UniversaJ Time (UT) is based upon earth rotation and is 
referenced from the Greenwich meridian. Since the angular velocity of the earth, Cilc, is 
not constant, Universal lime is also not constant. GPS uses the USNO Universal Time 
Coordinate (UTC) system, which uses atomic time scales that are considered to provide a 
constant lime reference. Because of the difference between UTC and UT, UTC is 
adjusted to UT when the absolute value of the difference between UT and UTC exceeds 
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0.9 Sl:~onds. UTe is adjusted by an integer value (;alkd a leap second [Ref. 5, p. 34]. 
However. GPS time is not adjusted for leap seconds. Therefore it is offset from UTe by 
an integer. Sio(;c June 1 i"' , 1990 at 0000 UTe lime, (irS system time has been given by 
a Composite Clock (cq. which is a composite of all Monitor Stations and satellite 
trequency standards [Rd. 4J. The GPS ,y~tem time is referenced to the master clock at 
[hI: lISNO , One microsecond is the lTlaximum time difference allowed betwcl:o the GPS 
system time and the USNO master clock before an adjustment is made In the past few 
years the to lerance has been within a few hundred nanoseconds. 
E. POSITION DETERMINA nON 
GPS lISCS Time Of Arrival 10 compUle pseudoranges. Tht:yarc called pseudorangcs 
bl:cause the receiver clocks have an offset or bias that causes the calculated ranges to be 
different from the true ranges. To do this each GPS receiver must have in memory a table 
of binary I s and Os representing the W\ique CIA code of each GPS satellite. The receiver 
tries to lock onto a satellite by genemting an identical code. However, the receiver code 
will be offset from the satellite code by the length oftime it takes the navigation signal to 
travel to the receiver. The receiver then slews its binary code W\til its sequence 
corresponds to the satellite code. This is done through the use of an autocorrelation 
function which goes from a value of 0 to a value of I when the two codes arc lined up. 
The slew offset is the time required for that navigation signal to reach the receiver. The 
pscudorange can be determined by multiplying this time by the speed of light. This is not 
the actual range because of the uncertain clock bias of the receiver and the propagation 
d Tects on the navigation signal as it passes through the ionosphere and atmosphere. 
With a minimum of four satellites' pseudoranges, the receiver can calculate its three 
dimensional position (X,Y.Z in World Geodetic System WGS-84 coordinates) and 
receiver clock bias by solving the follov.1ng four equations. 
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where X ... , Y .. " Z ... are the satellite coordinates and Xm." Y '""'> Z"", are the unknown 
receiver coordinates at a specific time. The speed of the signal propagation is given by c 
and 6.t is the clock bias. 
me accuracy of the clocks aboard the satellites is critical to the pseudorange 
measurements. In addition to Time of Arrival, GPS is capable of measuring signal phase 
shift used to determine the position and velocity. 
F. CPS ERRORS 
Understanding the errors involved this system will allow for the modeling and 
correcting algorithms to be developed to make the system more accurate. The errors in 
the GPS system can be broken down into six basic areas: 
• Ionospheric Errors 
• Tropospheric Errors 
• Clock and Ephemeris Errors 
• Receiver Noise and Resolution Errors 
• Multipath Errors 
• Selective Availability 
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1. Ionospheric Errors 
The ionosphere has been ddined as the: upper region of the atmosphere ranging 
from ahout 50 kIn through ahout 1000 kIn. [Rd. 6, p. 21!!J. Ultraviolet radi<ltion from 
the sun partially ionizes this gas in this region, hence the name ionosphere. All 
electromagnetic signals are aftecled as they pass through the ionosphere. Thi~ effect is a 
bending and slowing of the signal as it moves through the ;onosphere. The index of 
refraction accowlts for lhi~ effect and is gi ven by the equation: 
(7) a~Ji, 
where nl is the group and ~ is the phase index of refraction, t; is the plasma frequency 
(ionosphere), and fis the GPS carrier frequency. 
GPS receivers using code measurements to determine pseudoranges are dependent 
upon the group index of refraction, and these signals wi ll be delayed. Receivers using 
phase measurements are dependent upon the phase index of refraction, and these signals 
will be advanced. In either case the amount the signal is advanced or delayed is the same 
at a given time. 
If a receiver is capahle of receiving both the L, and the L2 frequencies, then it is 
capable of perfonning a dual frequency correction to remove the ionospheric errors. The 
follo wing is the dual frequency correction equation [Ref. 5): 
(8) 
(9) 
(1 0) A ~ Jads = a JNw 
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Given that p o is thc true rangc. \" is the electron colwnnar content, a is a 
combination of several constants and a;;~uming code ba;;ed range mca;;urement, we can 
substituting equation 9 into equation 8 to get the following equations for two 
simultaneous (samc time and place) measurements with two difIcrent frequencies 
(11) Pl=PO -~* 
(12) Pl=PO-~~ 
Equations 11 and 12 can be manipulated algebraically to yield equation 13 which 
simplilies to cquation 14. the dual frequency correction. 
(13) 
Equation (14) above only works if the receiver is capable of receiving both L, and 
Ll However, most civil ian receivers are only capable of receiving the CIA code on the 
L, frequency. Since the ionospheric delays can be more than 200 nanoseconds (equates 
to 60 meters), it is important to consider how civilian/commercial technologies address 
ionospheric errors. 
The Klobuchar model was developed to allow single frequency users to correct for 
ionospheric errors. It uses a cosine representation to model the daily flucruation in the 
rota! Electron Content (TEC), where the user latitude determines the amplitude and 
period of the cosine function. In order to use this model the user mu.;,1: be able to compute 
his geomagnetic latitude and the angle at which the satellite signal intersects the 
ionosphere [Ref. 2], 
The dual frequency correction can account for almost all of the delay caused by the 
ionosphere, whereas the single frequency correction is only capable of removing, on 
average, approximately 60% of the delay caused by the ionosphere. 
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2. Troposphere Errors 
Again, a~ the ~atellite's signal passes through the earth's atmosphere it is slowed 
slightly. This error is proponionai to the amount of atmosphere the signal mu~t travel 
"h.rough, Therefore, sig!1ab from a satdlite close to the horizon will lravel through much 
more atmosphere in order to reach the earth causing a signiticantiy i<lrger lime delay than 
signals from a satellite that is directly over head. TIle typical tropospheric delay ranges 
from 2.5 meters for a satellit<: dire!,;!ly overhead (an elevation angle of 90°) to 15 mders 
for a satellite close to the horizon (an elevation angle not less than 5') [Ref. 6, p. 21 Xl 
I'hcrc are several mathematical correction formulas that model this error. Appendix A 
describes one of these models 
3. Clock and Ephemeris Errors 
Satellite clock error is simply the drift or variation between satellite clocks. This 
<.:auses an error in the Time of Arrival (,lOA), affecting all jXlsition calculations. 
Ephemeris data contains information that allows the receiver to calculate satellite 
projected positions. The projection position is bll.'led upon the ephemeris data that is 
anywhere from 2 to 24 hours old, which may translate into Io:phemeris Io:rrors between the 
actual position of the satellite and its modeled position. These errors remain the same 
whether the receiver is using the PPS or the SPS level of GPS service. 
4. Receiver and Resolution Erron 
Klo:ceiver and resolution errors are determined by the hardware design to include the 
variations of all the components that make up the receiver, and are a function of the 
<.:hipping rate. 'llle magnitude of these errors is different for each receiver. However, 
typical values range from 0.1 tu 2 meters [Ref. 2, p.317]. "lbe errU[~ uue to receiver and 
resolutiun are invlo:rsely proponional to the chipping rate, and since the PPS has a 
chipping rate 10 times greater than the SPS, receiver and resolution errors are smaller for 
the same receiver whlo:n it is using the PPS. 
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5. Multipath Error 
t-.{ultipath exists because the s<ltdlite sign<lls may take different routes to the 
n:ceivcr. This is caused by the reflection of the satellite's signal, which in tum, c<luses the 
time dclay associated with the greater distance traveled. The GPS signal has been 
designed with several attributes to try to reduce multipath error. Fi rst, the navigation 
message uses right hand circular polarization. Therefore, when the signal is reflected 
(from many common surfaces) it is reversed to left hand circular polarization reducing the 
possihle interference. Since multi path is more likely to occur with low elevation angles, 
many GPS receivers ignore or mask signals received from satellites low on the horizon. 
Because the chipping frequenc y is ten times larger with the Precise Positioning System, 
the crror due to multipath is less than that of the Standard Positioning System. 
6. Selcctive Availability Error 
The United States goyemment intentionally puts extra ranging error into the 
Standard Positioning System to ensure only authorized users are receiving the full 
capability of the system. The average amount of error introduced into a SPS range is 
guaranteed 10 he no greater than 30 meters and is completely adjustable. "Ibis error is 
introduced by deliberately introducing errors into the atomic clocks and by degrading the 
naYigation message transmitted by the satellites. If the total accuracy of the SPS is going 
to exceed the accepted value of l()() meters, then the United States government has agreed 
to notify the International Civilian Aviation Organization (ICAO) at least 48 hours in 
advance. Figure 2.4 gives a visual representation of the typical range errors associated 
with P-code, CIA code, and OOPS and their relative weights. 
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Ephemeris Tropospheric 
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Figure 24 1 Sigm(l Range Error 
G. DlLVTION OF PRECISION 
TIle arc two major factors involved in determining the accuracy of the GPS signal; 
the first factor <:ncompasses errors in the pseudorange accuracy, which has been discussed 
ill the previous paragraphs. The second factor is the geometrical locations of the satellites 
with [e~peCl to the receiver. This factor is called the Dilution Of Precision (DOP), and 
links pseudorange accurdCY to position accuracy. The relationship bet\veen position error 
and pseudorangc: error is given by the following equation 
where cr"is the standard deviation of the position error and 0"0 is the standard deviation 
of the pseudorange error 
Dilution of Precision is a function of the satellite geometry with respect to the 
receiver. There are several different types of DOP, which are listed in Table 2.1 below. 
With the mininuun of fOUI satellites in view, the optimal geometry would include one 
.'latellite directly over head and the other three spaced 1200 apart near the horizon. If this 
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wen:: achieved, thc Position Dilution Of Prccison (PDOP) would be 1.6 [Ref. 3, p. 60]. 
Howcvcr to r('duce ionospheric, troposperic and multi path errors, receivers typically have 
a mask angle ofabau! 5 ·\0". 
Types of OOP Acronyms Typical user Equation 
Geometrical GOOP Theoretical 0' Jcr;+cr;+cr;+cr~ 
Time sync users 
Position POOP Air or Space Jcr~ +cr; +0"; 
related users 
Horizontal HOOP Maritime users Jcr~ +cr; 
ertical VOOP Air related users 
.Jar 
Time TOOP Time sync users Jar 
Table 2.1 
The DOP values are simply calculated using combinations of the diagonal elements 
of the following covariance matrix, which has been transfonned into a local north, east, 
and vertical coordinate system: 
n. DIFFERENTIAL GPS 
Up until now the discussion has been limited to stand·a1one GPS compared with 
other fOlTIlll of navigation. While the accuracy of stand·a1one GPS is more than 
satisfactory for most applications, stand-alone GPS accuracies do not meet the 
requirements for an aircraft during a precision approach. The civilian communitY has 
developed Differential GPS to substantially increase the accuracy to meet precision 
approach requirements and other applications as well. An aircraft·based Differential GPS 
sy~tem is composed of an airborne receiver, a ground reference station, and a data link 
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between the t.vo. Different ial GPS works by eliminat ing the errors conur.on to both the 
,eceiver and the re:-erence station. The errors that an: conunon to both are ionospheric, 
tropospheric, satellite clock, ephemeris. and selective availability. There arc variou~ 
forms of Differential GPS, and this research will be Jimitlo:d to the following: 
• Standard DGPS 
• Narrow Correlator DGPS 
• Kinematic Carrier Phase DGPS 
• Pseudolites 
1. Standard Differential GPS 
Standard Differential GPS requires two different GPS receivers. The first receiver 
is the roving (mobile) receiver, which is trying to obtain the very accurate position using 
a Differential GPS signal. The ~econd receiver, known as the reference station, is fixed to 
a prec isely known position. Both receivers calculate their positions using the GPS 
pseudoranges. Since the reference station knows its exact position, it can use satellite 
ephemeris data to calculate the range eITor to each satellite in view. The mnge error for 
each satellite in view is determined and then transmitted via a data link to the mobile 
receiver, allov.ing the mobile receiver to correct for these errors. Please refer to Figure 
2.5. One limitation of DGPS is that only sateliites which are tracked by both the mobile 
and the rcference ~tation may be differentially corrected. 
Of the six basic errors discussed in the GPS Errors section, all but receiver noise 
and multipath errors are highly correlated between the receivers. This is what makes 
Differential UPS so effective at reducing the position error. Muitipath errors are usually 
most pronounced when the signal is reflected from a reflective source very close, which 
would cause only a very short time delay, since the difference in distance would also be 
smal l. The GPS receiver uses an autocorrelation function to lock on to the appropriate 
signal and detennine the time delay used in computing the pseudorange. The 
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autocorrelation function uses I chip length. Therefore, any multipath signal delayed 
long~r than 1 chip will automatically be cut out of this process. Since a close refl ected 
signal will only be delayed in time only a very short period it will produce substantially 
more interference than il signal that has a longer delay. 
Figure 2.5 DGPS Corrections after Ref. [7] 
Ionospheric and tropospheric errors are correlated and the closer the two receivers 
are the higher the correlation. The GPS satellites are 20,200 km from the surface of the 
earth. Therefore, over short distances (e.g., 100 km), the signals traveling to two different 
receivers can be considered to be traveling along parallel lines. So a 100 km difference 
on the ground equates to an ionospheric penetration point difference of 100 km. Even 
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th()u~h the ionosphere varies, over these relatively small distances the CiPS si~nals will 
~\perience virtually the samc timt: Jdays and crrors 
Se~e~ tive availability is an error that is intentionally addt:d by the l)epartmcnt of 
Defensc and is a random variable, but the value at any specifIc time is COl:stant for all 
receivers tracking the same satellite. This gives a 100% corrdation between the two 
receivers with no data latene:y {tht: goal for all DGPS systems} and still remains highly 
~orrdated for small latency values associated typical Differcntial GPS systems. This 
makes it very ea;;y to remove most if not all of the seleetive availability error through 
Diflcrcntial UPS 
Receiver noise and resolution errors are unit dependent. However, this error tends 
to be very small, and therefore most receivers are considered to have approximately the 
same range of errors. 
Clock and ephemeris errors originate at the satellite and vary slowly with time. 
Therefore, even \-vith the small latency associated with DGPS corrections, they can be 
considcrcd as a constant error between the tviO receivers and have virtually a lOO~,'\, 
correlation in their errors. Illis makes it possible to remove almost all of these errors as 
well 
2. Narrow Corrclator DGPS 
The Narrow Correlator OGPS works on thc same principle outlined above for 
Standard DGPS. It requires two receivers with one of them being a rO\-'ing receiver with 
an unknown position, the other the reference receiver with its exact position known. 
Therefore, the error correction is the s.ame as above except for receiver noise and 
multipath errors, The time window that a narrow correlator u.:;es is much smaller than a 
standard GPS receiver. To compensate for this smaller timc framc, a narrow correlator 
receiver looks at a substantially larger band\',idth. A typieal standard CIA code receiver 
uses a 2 .\1Hz pre-detection bandwidth and a 1.0 chip spacing, whereas :\'ovAte]'s narrow 
correlator CIA codc rcceiver uses a 8 MHz pn::-detection bandwidth and a .1 chip spacing 
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[Ref. 8]. Receiver noise is reduced because the increased bandwidth provides sharper 
cdgt:s on tht: bit stream providing a much better synchronization of satellite and receiver 
CIA codes. Narrow correlator technology provides noise reduction because the noise 
component of the early and late signals are correlated and tend to cancel out. 
Since multi path signals travel greater distances they require additional time to reach 
the receiver. Therefore, the narrow correlator reduces the multipath eITor by closing the 
window on most of the multi path signals. All of these effects make a narrow eorrelator 
receiver more accurate than the Standard OOPS receiver by reducing the receiver noise, 
multi path and random noise errors. 
3. Kinematic Carrier Phase DGPS 
Kinematic Carrier Phase OOPS, as its name infers, deals with the position 
determination of a moving body using carrier pnase measurements. It was not long ago 
that kinematic GPS was considered too complicated to perform in real time as required 
for all types navigation. lltis complication was due to computations required by the 
current algorithms and that most receivers were single channel receivers that scanned all 
the satellites in view. However, technological advances in computers, multi-ehanlUlel 
receivers, and more efficient algorithms have made it possible. :\1ost real time navigation 
receivers that use kinematic carrier phase OGPS are based upon relative kinematic OOPS. 
Relative kinematic OOPS refers to the positioning of a mobile receiver relative to a 
stationary one. lltis requires that both receivers observe the same satellites. Using the 
carrier sinusoidal signal to detennine position requires a different observable equation 
from that used in Standard OPS. 
a. Carrier Phase Obset'WIble 
The carrier signal is continuously transmitted on the L, and L, frequencies by 
each satellite. lbe first step is for the receiver to identify and lock on to each satellite in 
view. lltis is done using the CIA code PRi'l, which is unique for each satellite. Once this 
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is ;;ccomplisncd , it is casy for the receiver to measure the phase angle and keep a flllllling 
integer cycle count (a cycle i~ I:quai to a 211: radians advance of the carrier phase or one 
wave ~englh ) based upon the Doppler trequency shin on the carrier frequency. The basic 
Doppler equation is given by 
where ("" is the Doppler frequency as a function of time, f, is the transmitted frequency 
(carrier frequency), R is the radial veloci ty, and c is the speed of light. Since satell ite 
velocity is avai lable through the ephemeris data, the velocity of the receiver can be 
calculated using the radial vclocity and satellite velocity 
At each epoch, the running cycle count and phase angle is availabk from the 
receiVl:r. The receiver accomplish.:s this by integrating the carrier Doppler frequency 
((",) . The integrat ion is carried out bem'een epochs, concluding with the receiver making 
a phase angle me<Ciuremen1. The mathematical relationship is given by the follo"'ing 
equatIOn: 
where ¢In is the accumulated phase at epoch in cycles. 
Receivers can typically make carrier phase measurements under dynrunic 
evnditions to approximately 1% of a cycle or wavelength, which equates to 
approximately 2 mm with an L, wavelength of 19 em. However, the integer number of 
~ycle~ or wavelengths bet\ ... een the receiver and the satellite at the time the receiver locks 
on to the satellite is unknov.ll. This is eallcd the integer ambiguity (N). Please refer to 
Figure 2.6 for a geometrical depiction of the ph<Cie range. The unknown integer number 
of wavelengths (N) remains constant while the fe\:eiver is locked onto the satell ite, which 
is represented by the equidistant arc from the point R (Unknown Integer Ambiguity Arc). 
As the satellite moves through its orbit, the receiver is capable of measuring the 
acwmulated phase once the receiver locked onto the satellite at to. The t..<p I and t..<P2 
represent the measured accumulated phase at times t, and t,. respect ively. 
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Set,) __ ------;p--- orbit 
earth 
Figure 2.6 Geometrical Depiction of Phase Range From Ref. [5] 
The distance between the receiver and the satellite can be expressed as the 
number of cycles between the two, which if necessary can easily be converted to a 
distance by multiplying by the wavelength. If we account for noise, integer ambiguity, 
clock biases, ionospheric, and tropospheric effects, this distance in units of wavelengths 
can be expressed by the following equation: 
where: 
¢l~ is the distance between the satellite and receiver in cycles 
cjl; is the satellite transmitted phase as a function aftime 
cjlr is the receivl:[ measured phase of the satellite signal as a function of time 
N is the integer ambiguity 
f is the carrier frequency 
1" is the associated clock bias (satellite or receiver) 
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is the carrier phase advance due to the ionosphere in cycles 
is the camer phctse delay due to the troposphere in cycles 
b. Differencing Techniques 
There are several errors and unknowns in the carrier phase mea~urcment 
observable equation described in the above paragraphs. By using diffl:rcncing techniques 
it is possible to reduce or eliminate many oflhl: crrors and unknowns. Differencing refers 
to the tt:(;hni4U1:S we use to reduce or eliminate the COlIUIlon errors in the observable 
equations through linear combinations of these equations. As discussed in the standard 
DGPS section above, there is a strong corrdation in the ephemeris, clock, tropospheric, 
ionospheric, and selective availability errors associated with the GPS signal over 
re latively shan distances. There are three levels of differencing, which are single, double, 
dIld triple differencing. As you move from single differences to triple differences you 
continue to n:duce the errors and increase the accuracy of the measurement. However, 
this also limits the solution to the vcctor between the referencc station and the mobile 
re(.;eiver. For navigation systems you need accurate as well as real time information, and 
both singh: and double differencing can be done in real time. However, triple differencing 
involves taking the difference over two different times. Therefore, for real time 
navigation. this particular differencing technique is not used and will not be discu~sed 
funher. To try to ease some confusion, superscripts s 1. s2, s3 etc. will refer to satellites, 
subscripts rl and r2 will refer to receivers, and any s12 or rl2 will refer to the difference 
bl:twl:en satellites or recl:ivers. 
(I) Single Differences. There are two different ways that one can take a 
single difference for navigational purposes . 
• Difference between receivers observing same satellite 
• Difference between satellites using one receiver 
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In each of these cases common errors are diiTerenced out. Figure 2.7 is an 
example of Single Differem;e (SO) betv.'een receivers while observing the same satellite . 
.. 
Receiver #1 
Figure 2.7 Single Differencing 
Using our carrier phase observable equation for two different receivers 
gives us the following two equations: 
(20) cD:: = ~ ~ :(t) - ~ $ l(t) +N~: +Srl +/t.l +/trl - ~'o" +51rop 
(21) cD~i = ~;i{t) - ~.l(t) +",~ +S,2 + /t.l +/t,2 - ~iO" + o/rOp 
Taking the difference of these equations yields the following Single 
DitTerence (SD) equation: 
This Single Difference (SD) removes the satellite signal phase and the 
satellite clock bias. With regard to the ionospheric and tropospheric effects, these also 
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Jrc rcmoved. assuming that over relatively shon distances these efl"i!cts are virtually the 
samc. This technique re'luires us to know the position of the reference fl:ceivcr and limits 
us to finding thc relativc position of the mobile recei ver with respect to the knov.n 
(2) Double Ditferences. The basis of kinematic GPS is based upon double 
diffl:rences. If we difkrl:ncl: any combination of single differellcl:, it produces a doubk 
difference. Howevcr, the most common way is to ditference between two satellites unce 
you have the single difference I:quation from the two receivcrs for one particular satellitc 
Figure 2.8 depicts the double differencing technique. 
Satellite #1 
Receiver #1 
Figure 2_8 Double Difference (DD) 
We can now develop another single difference equation for satellite #2, 
yielding the following single difference equations: 
(23) SD!~2 = $~:2 + N;:2 + S::2 + /td2 
(24) SD~~2 = $~i2 +~i2 +S;~2 +ft'12 
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Taking thc difference of these two single difference equations results in 
(ile following Double Difference (DO) equation: 
(25) DD~)~ = ¢l~)~ + N~g +S;)~ 
The Double Difference (DO) has removed the receiver clock bias terms 
from the equation. What remains is a combined carrier phase term, a combined unkno,",,"O 
integer ambiguity for the vector between the two receivers, and a noise term that is 
composed primarily of the combined multipath effects. It should be noted thaI N:)~ is 
still an integer, but represents Ihe unkno""11 integer between the tv.'o receivers. 
c. Carrier-Smoothed Code 
Thus far \\'e have discussed code-based unambiguous pseudoranges, which have 
a measurement noise (thermal noise) in the 2 meter range, and ambiguous carrier phase 
pseudoranges, which has a measurement noise in the 2 millimeter range. Manyoftoday's 
receivers use a carrier-smoothed code pseudorange, which is a blending of code and 
carrier pseudoranges to tilter out most of the measurement noise. One method of 
accomplishing this is to add an initial condition (b) to the Accumulated Delta Range 
(i\DR). Please ~efer to Figure 2.9. The ADR is simply the integrated Doppler (discussed 
earlier) tracked over a period of time. The initial condition can he estimated by the 
following equation: 
(26) b= ~ _ ,~., (p(n) - ADR(n» 
Then the carrier-smoothed code (P ,,,,oOlh) is given by: 
(27) p,.oo,,(I) = ADR(I) + b (I) 
The amount of measurement noise reduction can be estimated by the following 
equation: 
(28) Noise Reduction::::: --k 
iN 
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r[o\\;ever. the ionospheric effects cause the pseudorange and Accumulated Delta 
Rar:ge (ADR) to diverge:n :imc. Averaging can be done only over short periods of time. 
with a typical value heing 100 seconds This means the measurement noise is reduced by 
approximatciy a fa ctor of 10 
Measurement Noise 
!"il.,t:IIA:t'It+t' ..... Pseudorange 
.-l .... ---- ~~~t~mUlaled 
Range 
Time 
Figure 2.9 Measurement Noise difference between p and ADR. 
IL Integer Ambiguities 
Using DGPS and camer-smooth code a receiver is capable of detennining its 
relative position to within ±1-2 meters. This reduces the integer ambiguity to 
approximately ± 5- \0 wavelengths using the L, frequency. It seems obvious to simply 
iterate through all the pos~ible combinations using a least-squares solution to idetltify 
possible integer values. Then we can continue this process until only one ~olution 
remains. However, this is inefficient and requires enOnnOU5 computational power 
because an ambiguity of ±ll wavelengths would require 23' least square solutions to be 
generated at each cpoch fRef. 9, p. 38]. 
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To reduce this computational requirement and inefficiency. several different 
techniques h<lve been developed to screen potential integer solutions before any 
computat ions are performed. In general all of these techniques have the same basic 
algorithm. First an initial position is detennined. Then a search volwne around this 
position is established and some methodology is used to screen for pOlential candidates. 
These candidates arc then further tested and. given the selection criteria. fi nally only one 
solutions remains. 
4. Pseudo-satellites (or Pseudolites) 
A pseudo-satellite (false satellite) consists of the same GPS transmitter that is on 
board the GPS satellite but is ground-based. They may transmit on the L, frequency, or 
be offset from the L, frequency just like a regular satellite. Adding a pseudo-satellite has 
several different effects on the navigation solution. 
first it is decreases the Geometric Dilution Of Precision (GDOP). It is the 
geometry of the satellites that detennines much of the accuracy ofGPS. The farther apart 
the satellites, the better the accuracy. Since the pseudolite is located on earth and below 
the aircraft it significantly reduces the GDOP. Figure 2.10 demonstrates the geometric 
improvement from putting a pseudo-satellite on earth. It is also another satellite signal 
and the more navigation signals available the more accurate the navigation solution. 
Even if the receiver is nnt capable of monitoring all satellites in view, the receiver has 
the capability to select the combination of satellites that delivers the best GDOP. 
The pseudo-satellite signal does not have to travel through ionosphere and only a 
small portion of the troposphere compared to the signals originating from space. In 
addition, the pseudo-satellite is in a fixed known position. All of this adds up to reduce 
the amount of error in the navigation solution. Furthennore, the pseudo-satellite can 






Figure 2.10 Geometric Ollutlon Of PrecIsion (GOOP) 
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However, there are some disadvantage~ associated with pseudo-satellites. First, if 
lh..- signal power of the pseudo-satd li tes is too high, it can jam the navigational signal 
from the other satellites, which is refcrred to as the near/fw- problem. The range of the 
pscudo-satell ites is approximately 60 km (l ine of site). Pseudo lites also require additional 
aircraft equipment (at least additional antennas). 
KALMAN FfL TERING 
There is an error associated with each measur..-ment or observation. Therdore, 
even with a stationary aircraft it is possible that the observations would show that the 
aircrafi was moving . Hence, ti ltering is done to reduce this problem. GPS manufacturers 
use Kalman filters as a means of estimating the position of the aircraft based upon 




Figure 2.1 1 Block Diagram DepicUng System using Kalman Filter [Ref. 10, p. 31 
The basis behind state estimation and Kalman filtering is that there is a 
mathematical relationship between the observations Z(t) and the actual system state X(t). 
To establish this relationship a mathematical model of the measurement has been 
developed in the following equation: 
(29) Z, =h(X,t;)+v; 
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where Z, is :he obse:-ved :osition using GPS, h is a function that relates X to Z, and Vi i.~ 
l:1e error introduced :nto the observation equation hy the (iPS error sources and tht: gain 
matrix being in error 
This 1:4uation \vould work perfectly if the prohlem was linear. nul the motion of 
the aircraft is not :imited to linear motion. In fact, few things in nature an: actually linear. 
['it: problem with using a non-linear model is this that it requires enonnou~ 
compl!tations. This is not efiicient or practical for real lime navigation. Therefore 
r.lOdels arc Iincanzoo aooul thl;': most recent state estimate. Rdt:r to Appendix B for some 
further discussion on Kalman tilters 
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III. PRECISION APPROACH REQUIREMENTS 
A. nOD MISSION ,."EEDS STATEMK'fr 
On August 8th, j 994 General \Terrill A,\'kPeak (IJSAF Chid' of Staff,) signed the 
Joint USAF - USN Mission Need Statement ("'1NS) for Precision Approach and Landing 
Capability (PALe). This docLlffil:nl has been forwarded to the Joint Requirements 
Oversight Conunittcc (JROC) for review and validation rhl; next few paragraphs outline 
the details of this document. 
I. Defense Planning Guidance (DrG) Element 
The Defense Plmming Guidance [Y 1994-1999 states "Our investment in 
irmovation must be sustained at levels necessary to a,>sure that U.S.-fielded forces 
dominate the military-technological revolution," [Ref. 11, p. [OJ 'Ibis document 
identifies forward presence and crisis response as essentials e lements for our national 
defense To implement thes!;.': dements the DPG identifies "rapidly deployable, 
all-weather, day-night, survivable, mobile, and lethal ground combat capahility" as a key 
ractor under this new strategy [Ref. II, p. 41]. 
2. ,,"lission and Threat Analysis 
l:.S. fon;es need to be able to conduct air operations on any suitable surface world 
wide (i.e., land or sea) under any conditions (peacetime or hostile) with ceiling andlor 
visihility being the only limiting factor. Therefore, a requirement exist~ for a precision 
approach and landing capability (PALC) that is rapidly deployable, survivable, land and 
sea ba~",d compatible, and mobile, which is capable of operating 24 hours a day in alL lype 
of · ..... eathcr and tCITain conditions. ·111e Mission "'-eeds Statement (i\-lNS) states ·'None of 
thc cxisting systems comes close to satisfying the mission need for world wide 
deployment and interopcrability be1;v.een the services." [Ref. 12, p. 11 TIle optimal 
solution is a universal DoD system that is the same for all the scrviees, replacing the 
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current service unique systems that hamper joint operations. The system would 
incorr;orate the SlUTIe training, logistics, operations, and procedures to ensure 
interoperabi lity among Ihe services. This may not be entirely possible hecause of the vast 
differenccs between land and sea based operations for recovcring aircraft. However, 
there is no reason that the avionics for all aircraft shouldn't be compatible. 
Due to the reecnt drawdown and reduction in fOf',\,·ard operating locations it is 
imperati ve that the new system be developed now. U.S. fo rces must be ready and mobile 
if we arc to meet the our national security requirements without any degradation from thc 
reduction in· forces . The ~lNS states ·'There is no direct threat countered by this 
capability, but PALe is needed to pennit the introduction and support of air forces into 
any land or sea based theater of operations worldwide." lRef. 12, p. 21 The following is a 
list of the deficiencies identified in the MNS. 
• Current systems are manpower intensive and require extensive training 
of operators and/or support personnel. 
• Current systems have limited rapid deployment capability, are difficult to 
transport, require extended periods of time to set up, and require 
favorable weather conditions during assembly and system checkout, 
• Current precision approach systems do not provide covert, jam reSistant, 
data transmission and reception capability. 
• Vulnerabil ity of current systems in hostile areas is very high. 
• The precision approach systems in use by one or more services are 
incompatible with the capabilities of aircraft from other Services. 
• The variety of systems in use makes it difficult to realize logistics and 
support savings, and results in higher life cycle costs as systems are 
upgraded. 
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It is generally accepted that the forcn:ost threat co pr<:cisior. approach and landing 
systems wiil come from intercept and geoiocating systems capable of identifying, 
locating, controlling and disrupting these landing aids, The technology required for this 
type o f threat is fa idy advanced, and with the breakup of the fonner Soviet Union it is 
believed that the thn:at to PALe: is limited to only a few potential enemies at present 
However. wi th the wide proliferation of advanced ckctronic capabilities, il is easy to 
be liev!;.': lhat the majority of OUI potential cm::mies and even terrorists wil! have this 
technology in the near future. 
Commercial Of The Shelf (COTS) electronic components are su:;ceptible to 
electromagnetic pulse from nuclear detonations. However, these same dectromagnelic 
pulscs would have thc samc cffccts on othcr airfield operations and would render the 
airfield lillusable regardless if the precision approach system is working [Ref. 12, p. 2], 
thereby ncgating the need for a precision approacb system hardened to meet the 
electromagnetic pulse associated with a nuclear detonation. Requiring thc PALe to meet 
this requirement could resu!t in enormous costs v.ith a very minimal increase in 
capability. This is no way fl-<iuces the requirement for the PALe to be operated in an 
envirorunent with Nuclear, Biological or Chemical (NBC) contaminants, to include 
considerations fOf operating personnel equipment requirements. 
3. i'ion-material Alternatives 
1l1ese include changes to doctrine, tactics, training, or organization. To date, there 
are no known nun-material alternatives that can correct for the dcticiencies of the current 
0 00 Precision Landing System (PLS). 
4. Potential Material Alternatives 
Scvcral of the prccision landing systems in use today partially mcct these 
rcquirements. There are also numerous potential alternatives to meet the identified 







• Passive Autonomous Landing System (PALS) 
• Automatic Carrier Landing System (ACLS) 
• Instrument Carrier Landing System (ICLS) 
• Marine Air Traffic Control and Landing System (MATCALS) 
• Autonomous Landing Guidance Program (ALGP) 
• Autonomous Precision Approach and Landing System (APALS) 
• Austere Airfield Air Traffic Control (AAATC) 
• JSOC Jasmine Flower 
• Hybrid solutions 
5. Constraints 
Commercial systems ~hould be used whenever pos~ible for both air and ground 
systems. This can provide better interoperability throughout the world and also provide 
signiticant cost reduction from a research, development and production standpoint. A 
PAlC must also meet the following: 
• Manpower Efficient 
• Affordable 
• Supportable in the field and aboard ship 
• Rapidly Deployable 
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• Operate in adverse terrain 
• Operate in adverse weather 
• Operate within the defined threat spectrum 
F:lrthcr development of these constraints is provided in the following paragraphs. 
a. Logistics 
Great dfort has been made to consolidate and reduce the logistic demands on 
the 000 logistics system. Therefore all new systems must not place an additional burden 
on the system to indudt: support equipment 
h. Trtmsportation 
fo meet the requirement for a rapidly deployable system, A PLS mlL'll be 
transportahle by medium lift helicopters. 
c. Mapping. Charting, and Geode.fY Support 
["he Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) has established fannat standards, and the 
PLS must be able to accept these standards without any transformation. 
d. ldanpower, Personnel, and Training 
The ideal system will substalllially reducc thc manpower, personnel, and training 
requirements. As with logistics, it is unacceptable for the m:w systems to increase these 
rcquin:m<:nts, especially with the reduction in personnel and budgets. 
e. Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Information 
The PLS must capable of complete integration with the C41 architecrure. In 
addition the signal must be jam resistant and covert capable with the situation dictates. 
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f. Security 
The PLS signals must be fully compatible with DoD communication security 
(COMSEC) requirements. This includes COMSEC devices, procedures, and physical 
secunty reqlllrements. 
g. Standardization and lnreroperability 
The PLS must allow for transparent operations with both domestic and 
international air traffic control systems. In addition, consideration for the interoperability 
and compatibility with allied nation military forces should be considered. Compliance 
with the above will be based upon certitication testing. 
h. Operational Environment 
The PLS must be capable of operating autonomously in austere conditions 
worldwide (i.e., land or sea). In addition, the equipment must be easily operated and 
decont.aminated by personnel NBC equipment. 
L Cost 
In loday's shrinking budgets, this is a key concern. The PLS must show realistic 
cost figures and provide a rationale as to why it will provide (;O~t ~avings over the current 
systcm. 
6. Joint Potential Designator 
UecalUie of all the factors cited above and the fact we have gone from single service 
operations thinking 10 joint operations requires the PALe system to function in all of the 
services as well as all of the aircraft. It would be considered extremely beneficial if the 
ncw system eQuid ac(;ommodate the differences in current aircraft avionics, but a system 
tailored to future avionics is satisfactory. 
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LJ. FAA PRECISION APPROACH RJ:o:QUTREMFNTS 
The basic operationai intention of precision landing approach guidance is, and was 
in the past, to rninimizl: deviations from the intended Ilighl path. Up Wltil last year the 
only accepted way of measuring precision approach accuracy was through the use of 
Navigation Sensor F:rror (NSE). The increasing demand tor Catcgory 1Il precision 
approach landing systems has called for a revaluation of the NSF. technique and has kJ to 
the devdopmenl of the Required Navigation Performance concept (tunnd concept) for 
precision approaches 
1. Required .\avigation Performance (RNP) 
[hI;.': Required Navigation Performance concept is a statement of thl: navigation 
pcrformam:e m::cessary within a defined airspace. The klo:Y CO!J(;l;;pt of R..'\-P is the 
establishment of the aircraft containment surface (the tunnel), which partitions the 
airspace and ddint'ates the obstacle clearance surface. It establishes maximum errors 
(deviation from the intended flight path) for tht' ct'ntt'r uf gravity (CO) and airframe of the 
aircraft [Ref. 13, p. 22J. This corresponds to tv.'o concentric rectangular tunnels that 
encompass tht' approach path of the nmway. Please refer to Figure 3.1. 
Figure 3_1 Precision approach and landing tunnel ooundaries. From Ref. [13] 
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As tht: aircraft approachcs the runway tlueshold these tunnels become smaller and 
smaller_ The inner tunnd represents the aircraft center of gravity limits, and the center of 
gravity must remain within this tunnel 95 pt:rcent of the timc. The outer tunnel represents 
a containment surface that no part of the aircraft is allowed to extend beyond. The 
probability of any part of the aircraft extending beyond the outer tunnel must not exceed 
one for every 10' landings. Hence the Rl"JP is oftcn referred to as the "tmille! concept."' 
This number was deterrnint:d by examining the number of a~cidcnts over a ten year 
period that wcre attributed to the ILS and deciding that would be the baseline for furnrc 
landing systems. Thc total system is composed of all elements necessary to keep the 
aircraft position with the established tunnel. 
The RNP total system includes both elements on board and external to the aircraft. 
Therefore, the RNP is based the idea of Tow System Error (TSE) and notjillit Navigation 
Sensor Error (NSE). Total System Error (lSE) is the nns of the Navigation Sensor Error 
(NSE) and Flight Technical Error (FTE) (the accuracy with which the aircraft is 
controlled) as described by the following equation. where NSE includes both air and 
ground components [Rcf. \4, p. B-2]. 
(30) TSE=o JNSE2 .... FTE2 
The basic ~oncept behind this approach is to minimize thc requirements on the 
Navigation Sensor Error (NSE) by taking advantage of advanced technology which has 
given us the capability to reduce the Flight Technical Error (FTE). The RNP uses thc 







Accuracy refers to the aClUal rosition of the aircraft n:lativc to the intended position 
at any given instant in time. This difference in positions is referred to as the Total 
System [ITor (TS£), for [he RNP concept, the TSE system error must remain within the 
OIlier Immel (containmcnl surface) with the probability of exceeding the outer tunnel to 
be bs than 1.0xl0'; per approach [Ref. 15. p. ID-7]. The accuracy requin:ments for the 
total system including iruler and outer tunnel n:quirements arc outlined in Figure ],2. 
J. Inte~rity 
Intlo:griLY is the trust which can be placed in the correctness of the infonnation (hat 
is supplied by the navigation system. The system integrity has been established at lxlO,l, 
so that less than lout of every 10,000,000 approaches would violate the outer tunnel 
(contaillJIlent surface) because of the navigation system [Ref. 14, p, 0-1 J. This applies to 
all precision landing systems. The integrity of the system includes the failure rale of the 
transmitting system and the rate the monitoring system fails to detect any out of tolerance 
signals and provide timely warnings. For Difl"erential GPS systems, the allocation system 
of integrity has been subdivided into three segments . They are Ground Segment 
Integrity, Avionics Segment Integrity, and Data Link Integrity. Please refer to Figure 3.3. 
The ground segment integrity has been allocated a probability of failure of 3x I 0'· 
fRef. 14]. The primary mission of the ground segment integrity is to prevent an 
undetected fa lse navigation signal. 'lberefore this segment includes all possible failure 
modes of the ground station equipment 
A probability of tailure of 6xlO'~ was allocated to the avionics segment integrity. 
This segment has been defined as all functions from the removal of the data link eRe to 
the output of data for navigation. Failures of this type occur in one of two categories. 
The first is simpl) a hardware failure. The second occurs when the algorithm for the TSE 
fai ls 10 generate a warning when the aircraft violatt:s the outer tunnel (containment 
surface). 
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Figure 3.2 RNP Total System Accuracy From Ref. [13 ] 
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For the purposes of the integrity of funct'on allocation. t~e "airborne 
segm~nt" begins after the ""moval of th~ data link CRC in the aircra!"t. 
FiglJre 3.3 Allocation of System Integrity From Ref. (14) 
f inally, a probability of failure of I x I U·s has been allocated to the data link integrity 
lRcf 141. This means that over a 2.5 minute period the probability that the aircraft ..... 111 
violate the outer tunnel due to an undetectcd error must be less than lx l O-' 
4. Availability 
Availability is the capability of the entire system to provide the required 
navigational guidance at the beginning of the intended approach. For a navigation system 
that ha~ common transmitters for both primary and alternate sitcs (i.e., GPS bascd 
system), the availability requiremcnt is 0.999999 for Catcgory (CAl) III approach [Ref. 
15 , p. I B-13 J. This equates to a probability of I x I 0'-; that thc systcm will not be available 
when the aircraft arrives. It should be noted that scheduled and known outages for 
satellite maintcnance. ground station maintenance, testing, etc. do not count against the 
availability ofthc system. 
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a. Methodology for A vailability Determination 
The rules and regulations that govern Instnunent Flight Rules (IFR) operation 
requir~ primary and alternate sites with landing aids availahle at both. In the past each 
airport had its own navigation aid, and therefore the availability of each ~ite was 
independent. With the development of new navigation aids lik!: GPS, each site i~ no 
longer independent of each other, which has added to the availability requirement 
Please refer to Tahle 3 1 below 
~vai l~bility Category I Category II Category III I 
ReqUirements 
Primary Site 09975 0.9985 0.999 
Combined 0.99999375 0.99999775 0.999999 
Primary/Alternate Site 
1 Table 3. Sirawman Availability ReqUirements After Ref. [161 
The following equation was used to detennine the strawman availability 
requirements located in Table ].1 [Ref. 16, p. ]8-43]: 
where Au,) is simply the availability of all the system components at the airport where the 
approach is to be conducted. For any ground based system such as the ILS, Au,) is equal 
to I since all required components are located at the airport. This is not the case for 
~pace-based systems like GPS since their transmitters are in motion about the earth, and 
therefore it is possible that Au,) is less than unity. In fact, the complexity involved to 
calculate Au,) requires a computer model. 
~!1 is the availability of the complete system to include degradation andlor 
shutdown caused from system failures. It is simply the complement of the probability of 
failure (i .e., 1- probability of failure) . This takes into account the Mean Time 8etween 
Outage (MTBO) and the Mean Time To Repair (MTTR). ~f) can be calculated using the 
following fonnula [Ref. 16, p. ]8-44]: 
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A(",) is the availability of the system to perform routine and/or preventative 
maintenance when the system is not required for navigational purposes. For 
ground-based systcms Ihis is equal to 1. 
rhe numbers listed in Tab le 3.1 were cakulated based upon several 
assumptions. The first assumption is that future (i.e., GPS) systcms will at least meet the 
current availability requirements. The second assumption is the MTBO will exceed 2000 
hours as required for current ILS Category (CAT) I, II, and III [Ref. 16, p. 33-44J . 
Finally, it is assumed that the samc level of service was available at both the primary and 
alternate sites (e.g., both Category III), and that the MTTR is 1 hour, 
To undl:rstand what these numbers represent in acceptable down limes in 
seconds per year, please refer to Table 3.2 below. 
Category I Category II Category III 
Primary Site 78,840 sec 47 ,304 sec 31,536 sec 
21.9 hrs 13.1 hrs 8.8 hrs 
Combined 197 sec 71 sec 32 sec 
Primary/Alternate Site 
(Equivalent MTBO) (160,000 hrs) (444,444 hrs) (1,000,000 
hrs) 
5. Continuity of Function 
Continuity of Function is simply defined as the ability of the system to provide the 
navigation information necessary without any interruption during the approach, The 
total continuity requireml:nt for the entire system has been set at Ix l O..o! for a 105 second 
(2.5 minute) approach. Regarding continuity, the total system can be broken down into 
four segments, which lU"C the Ground Subsystt:m, the Space Segment, the avionics 
Subsystem, and Data Link Interference. Pit:ase refer to Figure 3.4 below. 
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• These numbers are not requirements, but represent strawman values intended to meet ground, air, arid 
data link segments 
Figure 3.4 Maximum Loss of Contifluity per Approach After Ref. [14] 
The ground subsystem is composed of all components on the ground including the 
data link hardware (i.e., router, transmitter). The ma.ximwn allowable continuity loss of 
the ground system includes any failure that would result in the loss of this function. 
Thl;.':se failures are broken down into two categories, hardware and warning. 
The space segment continuity is also broken into hardware failures and warnings. 
Unlike the other segments of continuity, it is difficult to analyze the effects of these 
failures on the continuity because the loss of one satellite can vary from virtually no 
effect to wIacceptable dilution of precision. It is this vast difference of effects that makes 
!hlo: allocation of continuity difficult and yet very important because manufacturers will be 
subject to the actual continuity. 
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The subsystem continuity is broken dO\\'ll into hardware failure and the 
tota l ,ystcrn error warning. The hardware failure includes the GPS receiver, data link 
receiver, or any other navigation avionics. Continuity loss due to total system error 
warni ng can bl: catlsed by either la teral or vertical excursion from the approach tunnel 
Ihc ailocation of failure rates is based on t-.HBO values derived from the stra\.\man 
values 
Data link interference has been a:>signed a fai lure rate of6xlO"" . This only includes 
the errors that occur in the transmission of the RF signal between the ground station and 
l11.e aircraft It should be noted that it is possiblt: to increase the data rate in order to meet 
this demanding continuity requirement. 
6. Rt'\"P Tunnel Incident Risk 
Figure 3.5 below brings together all of the factors in the R..\IP concept and shows 
how the risk is allocated 
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C. DOD EVALUATION CRITERIA FOR A PRECISION LAt'JDING SYSTEM 
In January 1993. the Precision Landing Study Advisory Group (PLSAG) was 
formed to oversee the development of the fumre military precision landing system. The 
overall goal is 10 produce the 000 Precision Approach and Landing System (DPALS) 
Evaluation Criteria. Their fITSt step was the oversight of the development of the Mission 
Needs Statement discussed earlier. Next, the Precision Approach Study Team (PAST) 
was formed. Their mission is to mesh the operational and technical viewpoints into the 
OPALS Evaluation Criteria based upon the rALC MNS. Cost and Effectiveness 
Analyses are being performed for the OPALS study to fac ili tate a smooth transition from 
the study to the Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis (COEA) required by DoD 
acquisition regulations. Therefore, the evaluation criteria are comprised of parameters 
from the COEA, which include Military Operations (MILOrS), Functional Objectives 
(FOs), and Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs). Before proceeding it is important to 
define these parameters. First, Functional Objectives (FOs) are qualitative statements of 
what the user wants (e.g., operate in adverse weather). Measures of Effectiveness 
(MOEs) are quantifiable measures of how well the FOs are performed (e.g., system must 
operate at 100 ft ceiling) [Ref. 17J. 
l. Classification of Military Operations 
Before developing the evaluation criteria, it is important to understand what are the 
potential ground-based operation envirorunems that the PLS would be subject to. \I/hile 
it is understood that there are an infinite number of possibilities, the PAST has divided 
them into four scenarios: Fixed Base, Tactical, Clandestine, and Shipboard, given that no 
classitication is perfect and that overlap is possible. It is possible and very likely that 
each of these scenarios will have different MOE values. 
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a. Fixed Base Operations 
Fi:\cd base operations are (;arried out at prepan:d air iidds that have a very small 
probahility of being locali:d near areas of hostile action. In addition they arc capahle of 
supporting rhe most demanding levels of air tranic on a continuous basis_ Military and 
civiEan air iidds in CONl:S and outside CONUS, to include training air fields, 
e,xamples of this type of operation 
h. Tactical Deployments 
TaclicJ.i deploymems of operations are made to unprepared areas (e,g bare bast: 
or a Marine t-:xpedilionary airileld). The polential for hostile actions is at least medium 
vf it is located m~ar the hattie front. Typically this type of operation lasts from a ti:w days 
to several months. A:r lramc flow is not expected to he as high as fixed base operations. 
An cxampk wuuld hum,mitarian relief efforts (e.g. Somalia). 
C. Clandestine 
Clandestine operations hy their nature would he secretive and usually behind 
enemy lines. They lypi<.:ally involve few aircraft and only for a short period uftime. The 
potential for hostile actions is very high. TherefOre, this type of operation requires 
ulmost consideration he given to sreed and tlexihilit)" An example of this would be 
Search and Rescue (SAR) missions 
d. Shipboard 
Shipboard operations involve all types of aircraft that are capable of landing 
ahoard ship. It is bdieved that aircraft camt:f landings cover the entire rangt: of expe<.:led 
air traffic. Based upon the situation, it is possible that thls scenario could require all of 
the qualilies of the three land·based scenarius. Some examples include Anti-Submarine 
\Varfarc (ASW), Amphibious, and Task Force (mulligroup) operations. 
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I). FUNCTIONAL OB.JECTIVES AND t\IEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS 
The Functional Objectives (FOs) and Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) listed 
below were developed by the members of the PAST. These are preliminary fi gures. as 
the PASrs resl:an.:h is not yet compll:te, However, these FOs and MOEs provide an 
excellent basi s for evaluation of any proposed precision landing system. When the values 
were assigned to MOEs some of them were given threshold (TH) and objective (OBI) 
values. It is important 10 understand the difference in these terms. A threshold (TH) is 
the minimwn acceptable performance or value for a particular MOE, while an objective 
(ORJ) is the goal or pertonnance that we are striving for. The information in the 
following paragraphs has been extracted from Ref. [17J. 
1, Safe Landings in Adverse Weather Conditions (FO) 
Four Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) have been chosen to help evaluate this 
Functional Objective (FO). Table 3.3 contains the specific values assigned to each MOE, 
and the paragraphs following the table help explain the MOEs and to some extent how 
they were chosen. 
MOE Units Fixed Base Tactical Clandestine Shipboard 
THIOBJ THIOBJ THIOBJ TH/OBJ 
Accident Rale Accident per 1 per 10- 1 per 10' 1 per 10" 1 per 10' 
Approach 
Decision Height Feet 100/0 200/100 3001200 tOO/O 
Time to Alarm Seconds 
Lateral sn 1W5 10 211 
Vertical 2i2 512 6 211 
Availability Percentage 99.5 99 95 99.9 
Table 3.3 MOE Requirements for Safe Landing FO After Ref, [18] 
a, Aircraft Accident Rate (MOE) 
Aircraft accident rate in this context has been defined as the probability of an 
a(;cident occurring when the PLS is used and that the major cause of the accident was the 
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majfunctio[~ ing of the PLS. The numbers in Table 3.3 art: considered working num bers 
as da ta to bci rlg wl lectcd on [listorical mi litary accident raks 
b. Decision Height (MOE) 
Decision height is the minimwn height above the runway that a pilot is allowed 
to descend in order to visually acquire the runway environment. De(;ision heights are 
dependent upon the capabilities uflhe landing system used by the airpon and the aircraft 
equipment 
c. Time to Alarm (MOE) 
Time to alarm is the tillle required to identity a guidance fault and indicate [hI;.': 
warning to the pilot. Current lntt:rnational Civilian Aviation Organization (IeAO) 
requirements will be used. These limes arc given in seconds, for both vertical and lateral 
navigation errors. For shipboard operations, the Navy currently achieves 2 seconds for 
both vertical and latt:ral. Since this meets or exceeds the mo~t stringent ICAO 
requirements, this will be the threshold, with 1 second as the objectiw for shipboard 
operal1ons. 
d. Precision Approach A vailability Percentage (MOE) 
Thc term availability in this context refers to ability to perform the approach at a 
given airfidd, not just the equipment avai lability of the PLS. Refer to Table 3.3 for 
established values 
2. Minimum Support Requirements 
rhe following paragraphs describe each of the MOEs identified for this FO, and 
please refer Table 3.4 for a summary oftht:st: value~. 
a. Number of Personnel Required to Operale System (,14.0£) 
rhi~ MOE was developed for Precision Approach Radar (PAR) or a PAR· based 
system which requires pt:opk to operate the system to provide navigation information to 
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the aircraft or pilot. A threshold of six and an objective of zero was establishcd. f or any 
proposed OGPS-based alternatives this number is zero, since the persotlllel requirement 
for GPS operation has already been established and all proposed OGPS landing systems 
do tlot requirc any additional people to operate the GPS system. 
b, Number of Personnel Required to Support System (MOE) 
Ihis MOE includes those personnel required to deploy and maintain the system 
Current system requirements range from 6 to 36 personnel. HO\\'cver, the threshold has 
he set at 4 with an objective of 0 (clandestine operation threshold is 2). 
c, Preventive Maintenance (MOE) 
This MOE takes into account ali the preventive and scheduled maintenance 
requirements to keep the system operational. The threshold has been established as 5 
hours every 30 days. '!be ohjective is 1 hour every 90 days. 
MOE Units Fixed Base Tactical Clandestine Shipboard 
TH/OBJ TH/OBJ TH/OBJ THfOBJ 
Operate System # Personnel 6/0 6/0 6/0 6/0 
Support System # Personnel 410 410 210 410 
Preventive Hours per Days 5 per 301 5 per 301 5 per 301 5 per3Q.1 
Maintenance 1 per 90 1 per 90 1 per 90 1 per 90 
Availability Percentage 99.5 99 95 999 
Table 3.4 MInimum Support ReqUirements 
3. Adequate System Capacity fOT Servicing Aircraft (FO) 
a. Aircraft Capacity (MOE) 
This MOE is the number of aircraft that the system can provide precision 
approach guidance to simultaneously. The PAR is capable of 2, while the lLS is capable 
of 5 (3 mile separation.). The threshold is 2, with the objective being 5. 
62 
b. COI'erage (Degrees in Azimuth and Ele~lltjo,,) (MOE) 
[his \10F establishl:s areas where precision approach guidance is requin::d. 
I'hcsc requirements arc stated in azimuth and elevation. Since thi s is a joint development 
each oflhe services provided their requ;n:ment thresholds arc listed below 
• AFfArmy +/- 10° azimuth , 2"_9° elevation 
• Navy (Ship): +/- 30° azimuth. 0°_20° elevation 
• Marines: +/- 23° azimuth, -1" to +7° elevation 
(:. RUllge (Nautical .~liles) (MOE) 
This is the range in nautical miles that systl:m is capable of providing precision 
guidance. Again, each service provided their threshold requirements. 
• AFfArmy' Threshold is 7 nm, Objective is 20 nm 
• Marines' Threshold is 5 nm (will accept 7/20 from above) 
• Navy Threshold is 4 nm (detectability factors a key concern) 
4. Security Commensurate with Intended Level of Operation (FO) 
A complete analysis of all documentation related to threat and security issues is 
being performed to assess any issues involving a Precision Landing System (PLS). This 
FO is applicable to all scenarios. However, special clm~idt:ration needs to be given to 
tactical. clandestine, and shipboard scenarios when evaluating new technologies. 
a. Range and Probability oj Detection (MOE) 
TItis is the range at which the enemy could det~t the navigation signal from the 
PLS. Ihe clandestine scenario is the primary candidate for this MOE. but is also 
applieahle to the shipboard scenario as well. This MOE is not applicable to the fixed 
base scenario (known position) and probably the tactical ~eenario, ~inee the enemy will 
presumably be aware of our activities. However, the u~e of Low Probability of Intercept 
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(LP I) technology will diminish the enemy's chance of detection at any range. The 
majority of signals used by PLS are Line of Sight (LOS), which are typically detectable 
at 10 nautical miles by grolll1d-based equipment and approximately 200 nautical miles for 
airborne equipment. 
b. SpooJabiiity (MOE) 
This is the ability of the enemy to cause erroneous navigation signals to be sent 
out by the PLS. The highest probability of spoofing is believed to be associated with the 
tactical scenario because the enemy is presumably aware of the operations and may '-"ish 
to disrupt landing operations. Usually the enemy needs to be fairly elose in order to be 
dTective, which provides the fixed base and shipboard scenarios with a slight advantage. 
Additionally, if the enemy is spoofing a clandestine scenario, the mission has already 
been compromised. l"he relative ease with which the system can be spoofed is the 
pnmary concern. 
c. Effective Range oj Jamming (MOE) 
This MOE is concerned with the distance at which a jammer can make the 
navigation signal unusable. Jamming is not limited to intentional enemy action, it can 
also be caused by unintentional interference from enemy or even friendly systems. The 
use of nulling antennas will be considered. 
5. Easily Deployable Ground Segment (ifrequired) (FO) 
This FO only applies to the tactical and clandestine scenarios and an important goal 
is to develop a PLS that has no ground segment. 
a. Setup Time (MOE) 
rhis MOE is the total time required from delivery of equipment until it is 
available for a flight check. The following numbers have been established based on input 
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from all the "cl" i<.;c s. it is expected that thi.:se nL;mbers could be traded with the MOE 
dea ling with the number of personnel required to support the system. 
• Tactical 24 hour thresho ld. 1 hou r objective 
• Clandestine: 4 hour threshold. 0.5 hour objective 
b. Susraillabifity (MOE) 
This has been ddim:d as the amount of time a system can uperate on external 
power before maintenance is required. The following numhers arc based upon the 
k.rlOwledgc of current systems. 
·Th reshold of 10 days, objective of 90 days (given a 90% probab ility) 
c. Internal (Batte1)~ Power Operations (MOE) 
This is the time that a system is capable of operating from inkmal (battery) 
power. This is expected to cover the normal mission duration to include takeoff and 
n::tum fo r landing 
+Threshold of4 hours, objective of 12 hours 
d. Transportahility (MOE) 
This :vtoE deflllcs thc modes of transjXJrtatiun the PLS ground equipment 
requin:s to move to thc intendcd area of operation, For systems that are not 
man-portable, it is desirable to have a roll on/roll off capability for case of movement . 
• Tactical: Threshold is 1 C-130, objective 1 ttuck 
·Clandes tine: Threshold a irdrop, objective man drop 
6. Intangible Factors 
In addition to the MOEs listed above, there arc several intangible factors that nced 
to considered as well. These include but arc not limited to the following: 
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• Interoperabi lity (e .g , inter-service, ICAO, Allied , etc.) 
• Schedule 
• Technical Risk 
• Additional Benefits (e.g , service multiple runways) 
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IV. EVALUATIor,- OF I)GPS PRECISION LANDING SYSTBIS 
In lhis chapter, an evaluation of several Differential GPS Precision Landing 
Sysccms (PLS) against the Required Navigation Performance (RNP) and the DoD 
:-cquircments oulli:led in Chapter III will be performed. With the rapid developmt:nt of 
OGPS technology and the enomlOUS potential for large profits. there are numerous 
vendors and research institutions proposing various OGPS Precision Landing Systems 
(PLS). lvfon:ovl:r, the FA.t>,. has been sponsoring Stanford University <md Ohio University 
to carry out independent flight test programs to demonstrate the feasibility of Category 
III Precision Landing System using GPS. In addition, the FAA has selected two 
contractors, Wilcox and E-Systems, to perfoml flight test demonstrations in mid 1995. 
Therefore. this evaluation wi!! focus on the systems developed by these four 
orgamzaliOns 
Since all of thesc systems are Differential GPS systems, many of the requiremcnts 
outlined by the RNP and 000 are fulfilled by !.:haracteristics that are common to all four 
of these systems. Therefore, this evaluation will be conducted in two parts. The first part 
will provide a system description/operation as well as discuss any requirements that are 
ac.dressed by the independent system characteristics. The second sc!.:tion is an evallUltion 
of the common characteristics of all the OOPS systems that address RNP and 000 
requirements. 
A. STANFORD UNIVERSITY'S INTEGRITY BEACON LA.NDING SYSTEM 
1. System Description JOperation 
The Integrity Beacon Landing System (I8LS) is based upon the idea of using 
'"integrity beacons" (pseudolites) to augment the aps signals. The system is !.:omposed 
of a differential reference station (ground station) and two integrity beacons. Please refer 
to Figurc 4. 1. Thc intcgrity beacons are placed underneath the final approach path of the 
aircraft. The transmitted powcr is approximately III W, to cnsure it doesn't interfere with 
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rece;ltion of thc GPS satellite signals (often referred to as the near-far problem) [Ref. 19, 
p. 150]. This also limits the reception of the integrity beacon signals within the "bubbb" 
shown :n Figure 4.1. Prior to reaching the integrity beacon bubbles, the aircraft is guided 
using traditional Dill"erential GPS (CIA code). Once inside the integrity beacon bubbles. 
there are substantial geometry ehangcs that occur, which allow the aircraft rcceiver to 
quickly resolve the intcgcr ambiguities. Once this is accomplished the aircraft s\\itches 
from conventional DGPS to kinematic carrier phase mcasurements and its associated 
centimeter level accuracy. 
Differential Rereren~_~.:~:.:~~~_. __ .. ~ 
w-
AirrortTower 
Figure 4.1 The Integrity Beacon Landing System (IBLS) From Ref. [20] 
2. Performance Against RNP Requirement!! 
a. Accuracy 
Stanford University has performed several hundred precision approaches using 
their Integrity Beacon Landing System in sevcral diffcrcnt aircraft ranging from a Piper 
Dakota to a United Boeing 737. This system has cxcl:edl:d the Total System Error (TSE) 
defined in the RNP as shown in Table 4.1. 
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To~al System Err:Jr Vertical 100ft Lateral 100ft Vertical 50ft Lateral 50ft 
Si,gma CJ 1,1 m 2,2 m 10m 2.1 m 
01 m 0,2 m 01 m 0,1 m 
~I +2cr 2.3 m 4.6 m 2.1 m 4.3m 
RNP 4,6 m 22.9 m TSO 15,5 m 
Table 4.1 Total S/stem ;:'re' for 110 Auto andlngs by Ur.lted Boeing 737 Frerr Rei. [201 
The flight data for the 110 autohmdings was plotted against the RNP 95% 
containment surface, At no time did the aircraft path penetrate the containrm::nt surface. 
P]case refer h,l Figure 4.2 below. 
Stanford Univers,ty I UnitedAJrines CAT III Fight Test 
Fig-Jfe 4.2 RNP Containment Surface 'IS. 110 Autolandings After Ref, [20] 
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b. Integriry 
Stanford's lBlS use~ Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM) to 
achieve a leve! of intcgrity that i~ bettcr than onc part in a billion (obtained through 
analysis, flight trials. and simulation). which exceeds the I0'\lP's requirement of 3.JxlO·) 
lRcf. 20j. It is the extrcmely accurate carrier phase measurement, which allow~ very tight 
thresholds to be set without exceeding the false alann rate. Reft:r to Figure 4.3. 
thresholds: 
Figure 4.3 above represents a conceptual plot of position error vcrsus 
mcasurement residual ior kinematic carrier phase and code-based RAIM. The ellipses 
rcpresent the associated probability error distributions, with carrier phase being the 
smallcr white cllipse and code-based being the larger shaded ellipse. In Figure 4.3 
equivalent thresholds were set, with the solid line representing kinematic and the dashed 
line representing code-based RAIM. As the ellipses move up the failure mode axis from 
the nonnal condition to the failure condition, it is casy to see that the carrier phase ellipse 
would exceed the threshold (solid line) long before the code-based ellipse exceeded its 
threshold (dashed line). Thresholds can be set to meet a given false alarm rate or to meet 
70 
the accuracy requirement. However, it not always possible to meet both, as depicted in 
Figure 43 . It is imponant to note that when the ellipsl;.':s move above the accuracy 
reqU!~ement, the kmcmatic ellipse has completely passed the threshold setting, while the 
wde-based threshold is still within probability of error ellipse. It is the capability to 
establish tighter tlu-esholds that gives carrier phase RAllvt a distinct advantage over 
code-based RArM 
Before kinematic RAllvt is used, the aircraft receiver mu~t solve for the integers 
e.S discussed in Chapter II. This is accomplished once the aircraft enters the integrity 
beacon bubbles, because the six or more independent measurements must agree with each 
r:ther within a couple of centimeters_ To achieve an imegrity level better than lx I0-9, the 
integrity protection radius would have to be set at approximately 30 cm, which is well 
within the minimum ac(;Uracy requirements of 60 cm (vertical) for CAT lITe approach 
Figure 4.4 illustrales this idea 
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B. OHIO UNIVI:<:RSlTY'S CODE·PHASE DGPS 
Ohio University has developed two different approaches to OOPS precision landing 
systems. The first system they developed was a carrier phase based OOPS system that 
uses a least squares iloating solution for navigation until the integer ambiguities are 
resolved. This is virtually the same as E-Systems version presented in Section 0 oftrus 
chapter. Ohio University is currently refining a code-phase OGPS system, which is 
discussed in the following paragraphs. 
I. System Description !Operation 
Ohio University'S OGPS system consists of a ground reference station and a VHF 
data link. This system is based on both the ground reference station and the airborne 
platfonn using a narrow correlator receiver. A ground reference station in the vicinity of 
the landing strip is required for this system to operate. One ground reference station is 
capable of simultaneous serving all runways within a 20 nautical mile radius, provided 
[he relative vector between the ground reference station antenna and the runway intercept 
point (RP!) is precisely known [Ref. 22]. The ground reference station receives the 
signals from all satellites in view. This system differs from a traditional OOPS ground 
reference station. A traditional ground reference station calculates and then broadcasts a 
single message with the differential corrections for all satellites in view, whereas this 
system generates two separate messages that are broadcast to all airborne users neither of 
which contains standard differential correction infonnation. 
rhe first message contains the raw measurement data from the ground reference 
station. This message consists of the measurement epoch, satellite vehicle identification, 
unfiltered pseudorange measurement, and the Integrated Doppler shift for all satellites in 
view. The airborne processor perfonns the standard differentia] calculations necessary to 
determinl! the Selective Availability (SA) range correction, which reduces the 
transmission data requirements. 
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The second message cons:sts of the derived Sekctive Avai iahility range rate 
corrections. These range rates an.' calculated for each satd lite. which can he using the 
difference between two successive Integrated Dopp ler measurements whi le aceolUlling 
tor the known satellite motion over the same period rRef. 22J . 
2. Performance Against Rt'lP Requirements 
u. Accuracy 
Ohio University has conducted several flight tests reSUlting in several hundred 
approaches. In addition, the Carrier Suitability Department at \ ·aval Air Test Center, 
Patuxent River, MD, has also been using Ohio University's code to conduct numcrous 
!l ight tests over their oVon. The ac(;ura(;y re~ult~ from Ohio University's latest Oight test 
are given in Tahle 4.2 . There were 50 autolandings performed over a two day period. 
The versatility of the system to support multiple runways was demonstrated by 
perfonning approaches to three different runways, without requiring any (;hange in the 
ground station or thc aircraft Flight Control Computer (FCC). The mosl promising asped 
of this system is that it exceeds the accuracy requiremeng for RNP CAT III approaches 
and you do not havc to solve for integcr ambiguities. 
Total System Error Vertical 100ft Lateral 100ft Vertical 50ft Lateral 50ft 
Sigma (J 0.947 m 1.44 m 0.947 m 1.44 m 
-0.147 m -0.539 m -0.147 m -0.539 m 
I~ + 2" 2.041 m 3.419 m 2.041 m 3.419 m 
RNP 4.6 m 22.9 TBD 15.5 m 
Table 42 Total System Error for 50 Autolandings by UPS Boeing I~I 
The !light path data for the 50 auto landings was plotted against the RNP 95% 
containment surfacc. As can be ~cen in Figure 4.5, at no time did the aircraft even come 
dose to penetrating the containmcnt surface. 
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Figure 4.5 Total System Error vs. RNP Containment Surface for 50 Autolandings From Ref. [22] 
h. integrity 
The main purpose of the flight test was to show the feasibility of code-based 
DGPS precision landing system to meet the stringent Category IIIAIBIC precision 
approach requirements. That is why very little was done to check the integrity of the 
system and why no ground-based integrity checks were set up for the flight test. 
Howevcr, thcre was some airborne integrity provided through Fault Detection and 
Isolation (FDl). FDl was also used to ensure the consistency of the Integrated Doppler 
mcasurements, which allows for detection of cycle slips providing additional integrity 
checks for the system. There were 50 precision approaches flown with no integrity 
problems encountered. 
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C. WILCOX'S NARROW CORRELATOR DGPS 
Wilcox has been chosen to participate in :hc FAA tligh! tes t to demonstrate the 
feasibility of DGPS as a Catl:gory III precision landing system , For proprietary reasons. 
the information available on Wilcox's pn:cision landi ng system was limited. 
1. System Description IOperation 
This system ditTers slightly from a tradi tional OUPS ground ret~rt:ncc station. in 
that it uses a (Jarrow correlator receiver and a carrier phase smoothing algorithm to 
substantially reduce tht: random noise and multipath effects. Wilcox's OGPS system 
consists of a ground rcfcrcncl;.': stat ion and a VHF data link. This system is hased on both 
the grotmd reference station and the airburnc platfonn using a narrow corrdator receiver 
A ground reference station in the vicinity of the landing strip is required for this system 
lO operate. One ground rderence smtion is capable of simultaneously ~erving all nmways 
within the reception range of VHF data link. provided the relative vector between the 
ground reference station antenna and the nmway intercept point (RPI) is precisely knO\VIl. 
r he ground reference station receives the signals from all satellites in view. 
2. Performance Againsl RNP Requirements 
a. Accuracy 
Wilcox has fl own several hundred instrument approaches to demonstrate the 
capability of their system. [n September of 1993, forty instrument approaches were 
flo\VIl to nmways 28 and 16 at Wallops Flight Facility in Virginia. Of the forty 
approaches, thirty one were hands·off automatic landings. The system exceeds the RNP 
requirements for accuracy [Ref. 23]. Please refer to Table 4.3 Ix:low. 
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b. Integrity 
The main purpo~e of the flight test was to ~how the feasib ility of code-based 
DGPS precision landing sy~tem to meet the stringent Category IIIB precision approach 
requirements. That is why very little was done to check the integrity of the system. 
There were 40 precision approaches tlown with no integrity problems encountered. 
During the FAA flight test demonstrations, Wilcox ""ill be using RAIM, 32 bit CRe, and 
multiple monitor comparison to provide high integrity for the system. 
D. [-SYSTEMS 
l. System Description IOperation 
E-Systems has proposed a carrier phase DGPS system that does not use any 
pseudo lites. The system is composed of a ground reference station and a VHF data link. 
The ground station and the airborne platform use an Ashtech Z-12 DGPS receiver. The 
airborne receiver is expected to receive the DGPS signal at approximately 19 miles. 
Using the DGPS signal, the airborne receiver will calculate a floating integer ambiguity 
solution. At approximately 10 miles from the runway the airborne receiver will start 
converging on the correct integer ambiguity, with the fixed ambiguity solution obtained 
before reaching the Final Approach Fix (approximately 5 miles from nmway). This is 
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APPIIOACH DISTANCE (om) 
Figure 4.6 E-Systems Accuracy Profile From Ref, [24] 
2. Puformancc Against R. .... P Requirements 
It should be noted that E-Systems is participating in the FAA flight dl:monstrations 
this ycar to dl:monslrate the feasibility of Category IIIB appruachl:s u~ing OUPS as thl: 
navigation source. This ha~ resulted in E-Systems being very careful about what 
information they make available for the general public at this partiwlar time, limiting the 
depth oft)lis evaluation 
a. Accuracy 
E-Systems has conducted nwnerous simulations to verify and validate their 
system In addition, on May 23, 1994 a test flight was conducted using their system. 
After reviewing the flight tt~t data, E-Systems came to the [allowing conclusions [Ref 
241 
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Real Time ambigu ity resolution for all approaches by at least the 4.0 
nmi prior to threshold, after being reset at 10 nmi 
Wide lane and L, ambiguities remained fixed after 2 minutes for 
balance of approach 
Accuracy was well within expected limits 
The results ind icate that the same sets of ambiguities were resolved for 
both the real time and post processed data 
Once the integer ambiguities have been found, the system easily meets al l the 
accuracy requirements of the RNP. Please refer to Figure 4.7 for a plot North, East, and 
Up versus a run time of300 sewnds for the flight test conducted on 23 May, 1994. 
h. Integrity 
As with the Stanford system, the accuracy of carrier phase measurements 
provides for greater integrity by allowing the thresholds to be set tighter. E-Systems is 
using both ground equipment integrity monitoring and airborne equipment integrity 
checking. The ground equipment searches for and identifies bad satellites, as well as 
insuring the integrity of the VHF data link signal and data. The air borne equipment 
verifies the integrity of the uplinked data, performs RAIM, issues integrity alarms and 
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Figure 4 ,7 E-Systems North, East. and Up Errors vs. Run Time From Ref. [24J 
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E. WIDE AREA ALGMENTED SYSTEM (WAAS) 
rhe Wide Area Augmented System is a OOPS ~ystem that is designed to cover the 
entin:: United States. It uses 26 ground stations located around the United States 
(providing a U.s. average correction) and a geostationary satellite 10 replace the ground 
reference station and VHF data linle This satellite would provide the required OOPS 
corrections data to all the aircraft. The problem with this system is that errors such as 
t~opospheric and ionospheric delays vary from area to area, which means the broadcastcd 
DOPS corrections will not be as accurate as traditional OOPS. This limits WA.AS to 
Category I approaches and requires a local area OOPS ground station to meet the 
accuracy requirements for Category IIIlII approaches [Ref. 25]. 
F. DGPS COMMON CHARACTERISTICS 
All OGPS systems use GPS as their starting point. In addition, all the systems 
being reviewed in lhis paper also nave a ground reference station and a data link 
operating in the VHF radio frequency in their architecture. It is this commonalty that 
allows the following requirements to be discussed relative to OGPS in general, instead of 
addressing them system by system. 
I. Meeting RNP Requirements 
As discussed in Chapter III, the RNP uses accuracy, integrity, availability, and 
continuity as the four main parameters in defining the requirements for a precision 
approach. Accuracy and integrity are system dependent, but availability and continuity 
for the most part are dependent on the functioning Global Positioning System. 
a. Availability 
The major factor that determines the availability of OGPS predsion landing 
system, as with most GPS based systems, is the number of satellites within view at a 
particular localion at a particular time, which is often referred to as the salellite 
constellation availability. The satellite constellation availability has been calculated at 
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99.80%, ,vben defining constcllat iorl avadahility as '" or more operariunal satell ites in 
VIC IS ahove a mask angle of 7_5 degrees and having a VDOP of less than 4.5 [Ref. 26, p. 
H- 31 I,f the DOPS system uses RAIM. the minimum nlUllber of satellites increase to 
live. This number is slightly less than the 99.990% required for a primary site 
availability requirement ur the 99_9999% required for a combined primary/alternate si te 
:-equirement discussed in Chapter III. 
The satelli te constellation availability does meet all of the DoD requirements iQf 
availability I;.':XCl:pt for shipboard operations which is currently set at 99.90%. However, 
by reducing the mask angle or increasing the minimum VDOP it is possible to increase 
the satellite constellation availability, which is simply changing the definition. The 
availability of the system can also be increased by adding some satellites to the 
constellation. Either of the these options are viable, but it may make more sense to just 
accept the slightly lower availability figure for shipboard operations. The effect on 
shipboard operations by reducing this availability should be looked into, but \\,111 not be 
addressed any further in this paper. Stanford University's IBLS has dcmonstrated the 
ability 10 accept a VDOP as high a:; 18 with no apparent dfect on the accuracy of the 
system [Ref. 20]. The more advanced technology is capable of handling a higher VDOP, 
so reducing the required VDOP in the defmition doesn't necessarily mean a reduction in 
accuracy. 
There is also a very small contribution to the degradation of avai labi lity caused 
by the expected failure rates of the ground reference station and DOPS data link. This is 
because these systems are composed of solid state electronics and have a very low failure 
b. Continuity 
As with a .... ailability, continuity is fairly uniform among all OO PS systems, with 
thc satellites in view a~ the major factor. The continuity for a navigation solution (four 
satellites required) o .... er the standard 2.5 minute approach interval is 99 .99924% or a 
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7.60xl0·' probability that thcre will be less than four satellites in view and operational 
during the approach [Ref. 26, p. H-3]. 
The ground reference station, data link and aircraft avionics also contribute an 
cxtremely small amount to the overall DGPS probability of failure. The continuity 
assoc:ated with thi~ equipment can be e~timated with the following formula [Ref. 26]: 
(33) Plm! =- 0 04,:~~:67 
where, 
Pro;1 is the probability offailure during a standard approach 
0.041666667 is the 2.5 minute standard approach converted to hours 
MTBF is the Mean Time Between Failure expressed in hours. 
Using a conservative MTBF of 4,000 hours for the data link and accounting for 
a back-up (redundancy required for CAT III approaches) data link (in parallel), the 
probability that both would fai l works out to be I.1xIO·10, which is indeed extremely 
sma!! when compared to the sate!!ite system. The probability of failure nwnbers are 
similar for the ground station and aircraft avionics as welL 
There is another factor that can degrade the continuity of a system. This factor 
i~ called the false alarm rate. As discussed in Chapter Ill, there are established limits for 
this factor as well. The higher accuracy of kinematic carrier phase measurements allows 
the system to establish tighter thresholds on false alarm rates improving the continuity of 
this system. 
Taking all of this into account, the probability of failure exceeds the RNP 
requirement of lxlO~ for the same standard 2.5 minute approach. 
2. ~leetiDg DoD Requirements 
rhc most of the requirements outlincd in the MNS and OPALS are met or exceeded 
by any of the OOPS systcms reviewed in this paper. The common characteristics that 
address thosc requirements are discussed below. 
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a. Lu;:istics 
(1) Set up Ti:11<: The set up time for these systems is less than two hOllis , 
O;lI~ hour typically heing minimum set up time. The major faclOr in the set up time 
is the sdf slI[vey:ng re~llljrcd for the ground rcfcrem:c station, which is approximately one 
hour 
(2) Rattery Power. SineI;': these systems are in the developmental stages, the 
ground rden::nce stations are llSltally composed of a laptop computer and a GPS n::ceiver, 
both of which have the existing capabilities to operate for several hours on intcmal 
bartery pmvcr. Stanford University ha:; been u~ing a ~tandard car battery for it~ ground 
station and could operate for at lea~t six hours. Stanford's pseudolitcs are capable of 
running for over :2 hours on a 9 volt battery. Current technology can t:a:;ily meet the 4 
hour threshold t:stablished in the OPALS. 
(l) Supply System Demands. rhe adoption of a DGPS system would not 
place any additional demands on the supply system. Since GPS and wmputers are 
widely ust:d in lhe DoD, many of the components to these systems are already available 
in the supply system. Actually, the adoption of one standard precision landing system 
across all or the services would greatly reduce the requirements on the supply system and 
significantly contribute to the use ofa common 000 logistics support system. 
(4) Dt:ployability. All or lhe systems are easily deployable. The Marine 
Corps uses the ;"'Iarine Air Traffic Control and Landing System (.\-tATCA.LS) as a 
deployahle system. The TP::-.'-22 is the radar that provides the automatic landing system 
(;apabiUty. TI1e radar is 12 ft long, 8 [t wide, 6 ft lall , ill1d weighs 5,732 lbs. A OOPS 
syslt:m can provide the same capabilities, while only requiring the same space as a large 
laptop computer and is capahle of being carried by one person. All of these systems meet 
the deployability ohjectives discussed in Chapter III. 
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Shipboard operations pose a special problem for the Stanford's lBLS 
syslem because the pseudolites are set up on both sides orthe tinal approach path. With 
shipboard operations, the final approach path is over water and the ship is also moving 
making it impossihle to ,imply place the pseudolites along the flight. However, there are 
scveral solutions to this problem. 
First. the pscudolites could be mOl.Ulted on each cnd of the aircraft carrier, 
with directional beacons to reduce any radio interference and detection probability. 
Stanford has .shown that the integers can be held for normal traffic patterns maneuvers, 
including banking maneuvers up to 60 degrees. This would rcquire the aircraft to pass 
over thc aircraft carricr prior to landing, but only whcn an automatic landing was to be 
pcrformed since Stanford's standard DGPS signal would be accurate enough for all other 
landings. 
Another solution, was a towed buoy. Dr. Clark Cohen at Stanford 
University, thought it would be relatively simple to develop a towed buoy for the 
pseudolites lRcf. 27]. Again, the buoys would only have to be deployed to conduct 
automatic landings. 
Finally, an aircraft carrier is never deployed without escort ships of some 
type. The pseudolites could be mounted on an escort ship, with the escort ship located 
underneath the standard holding pattern for the aircraft carrier. As with the other options, 
this would only be required of automatic landings. 
b. Transportation 
All of the DGPS systems require a ground reference station and a data link to be 
located in the vicinity of the intend runway (approximately 20 nmi). Although these 
systems are still in the development stage, it is possible at present to pack an entire 
ground reference station and data link into a large laptop computer carrying case. 
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Stanford l :nivers ity 's system also [neludes two pseudolitcs that are the size of 
half ~l basketball and require cable to be run between the pseudolites and the ground 
reference station. The cable and the pseudolitcs add approximately another 150 Ibs. 
Even with the addition"l weight n:quin:ments for Stanford Lniversity's system, all of 
these systems an: cap"ble of heing transported on personnel on foot, which meets the 
DoD Objective 
c. ilJanpower, Perwnnel, and Training 
rhl:: minimum number of persormc! to set up the system is one, with three being 
optimum to reduce set up time. Once the initial setup is completed, no personnel are 
required to operate the system. It will take no more than two days to train the personnel 
on the complete setup and operation of this system [Ref. 27]. 
d. Mapping, Charting, and Geode~y Support 
The Global Positioning System was developed for the DoD and meets all of 
these requirements. Currently OPS use WOS-84 as its datum reference. The OOPS 
systems au~ment the GPS system and have virtually no effect \vith respect to these 
requirements. 
e. Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Tn/ormation (C'I) 
GPS ha~ been in use by the LJoD for over a decade. It was used extensively in 
the Gulf War to aid in C4 1. The DCPS systems looked at in this paper augment our 
current C~I and are not expected to present any additional problems or complications for 
our C' I system. 
f Security 
Conceming a precision landing system, security refers to ability to protect the 
navigation signal from jamming and spoofing. The DoD understood the potential threat 
from Jamming and spoofing when CPS was being designed. and this is why we have the 
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encrypted Y -code on !loth the L, and LJ lrequencies. The following paragraphs discuss 
the security capabilities of DOPS 
(1) Jamming. OPS uses a spread spectrum signal, which provides a 43 dB 
jammer-to-signal ratio juS! due to the processing gain. This number can be increased 
significantly by incorporating anti-jammi ng circuitry and null steering antennas as well as 
Olher sophisticated technology. To illustrate this, consider a jammer located only fifty 
miles away and a OPS receiver using the P-code. In order for the jammer to be effective. 
it would have to be capable of generating at least 25 watts of jamming power. This 
amount of power would produce an easily identifiable signature, which also can be easily 
targeted and destroyed. The VHF data link is susceptible to jamming as well, but 
because of the close proximity between the ground station and the aircraft a high power 
jammer would he required to interrupt the navigation signal. 
(2) Spoofing. This refers to how easy it is to generate a false navigation 
signal that the receiver believes to be true. The use of the encrypted V-code, which is 
available to military users, makes it virtually impossible to spoof without having the 
encryption key. The data link is VHF and can be easily adapted to plug into any of the 
COM SEC equipment within the 000, giving it the same protection against spoofing as 
the GPS signals. Stanford University's system uses pseudolites, transmitting on the same 
frequency as the satellites. These pseudolites are also easily adapted to accept DoD 
COMSEC equipment to encrypt their signals as well. 
(3) Detection. Stanford's pseudolites are beacons which can be detected. 
However, they only transmit IJJW, which reduces the detection range to a few hundred 
meters of ground based detection equipment. As mentioned above we can reduce this by 
using the encrypted Y -code. The data links are VHF transmissions, which are also easy 
\0 dt:tt:ct, hut the use of low power transmitters, directional antennas, and the encrypted 
Y -code will significantly reduce the probability of detection. 
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rhest:: systems can be .:onfigured to meet or exceed current DoD capabi lities for 
communication security 
g. Sium/urilizution and fnteroperubility 
With the adoption of a GPS based preci sion landing sy~tl;.':m, interoperability 
Oelwe:en the services is easily achievable, It will also simplify all aspects of aircraft 
nav igation by providing a singk and seamless type of navigation from take off to landing. 
rhe FAA has approved a (iPS Special Category I approach, and leAD i~ following in the 
same footsteps . With all of the time, effort, and money being spent on OOPS and its 
cnonnous potential, it seems inevitable that OOPS will be implemented and accepted as 
an inte rnat ional standard. This wi ll only add to the military's capability tu operate in the 
nat ional and international airspace 
h. Opl.'rrltivllul Environment 
fhl;; DGPS systems reviewed in this paper are capable of working in all type of 
weather. The only limitation on It:rrain is that thc data link antcnna must have a ckar line 
of sight 10 tht: aircraft. For the Stanford University system, the pseudolites must also 
have a clear line of sight to the ai rcraft within tht: intt:grity b ubble radius. Thl;; only 
lim itat ion to the number of aircraft these systcms can support at any ont: time is aircraft 
spacing requirements. 
(\) Stanford University. [his system is still being refined, hut the people at 
Stan ford believe that this system can be installed at cost of approximately $200,000.00 
per runway end. which includes all required redundancies for a Category IIIC approach. 
This tigure is approximately 80% cheaper than an ILS or MLS system as discuss!:d at the 
[SPA '95 conference in Braunschweig, Gennany [R!:f. 27]. 
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(2) Ohio University. The code and system hardware arc being rdined. The 
COSI tor the ground reference station and data link, including software, is approximately 
$80,000.00, which is capable of servicing multiple runways and possibly multiple 
2. irports2.s we ll. 
(3 ) Wilcox A price quote was not available, but the hardware and software 
designs are very similar 10 Ohio University, so an approximate cost of$80,000.00 should 
be very reasonable. This system is also capable of supporting multiple runways 
(4) E-Systcms. Again, a price quote was not available. The hardware 
requirements are virtually thc same as Ohio University and Wilcox, but the softv..are code 
is substantially different. However, the overall cost should be approximately the same as 
Ohio University at $80,000.00. 
[t should be noted that airborne equipment required for all these systems is a 
approximately $70,000.00 per aircraft, because they are typically sold with the vendor's 
Flight Management System. Furthermore, if additional redWlciancy is required to be 
installed, the cost may double. 
88 
V. CONCLOSIONS AND RECOMMENDATrONS 
A. CONCLLSrONS 
To provide some clarity, my conclusions will broken into three areas: Diffen::ntial 
GPS and RNP n:quiremenls, Differential GPS und 000 [l:l.Juin::ments, and general 
1. Differential GPS and RNP Requirements 
Current Differential GPS technology is mocc than capable of meeting the accuracy 
requirements for all categories of precision approaches, to include the most demanding 
Categury !II requirements. Continuity ami availabi lity requirements can be mel using 
DGPS . The required redundancy in avionics and ground station equipment for precision 
landing systems has resulted in the GPS satellite constellation becoming the major factor 
invo lved in de te rmining the continuity and availability. 
Unt il recently. the primary foc us has been on the ml:eting the accuracy 
requircments for Category III approaches. With this aspect of DGPS under control, the 
commercial sector is starting to scriously address the integrity issue. Integrity, as with 
accuracy, is a system dependent characteristic. Stanford University has addressed this 
issue, and is boasting a level of integrity better than IxlO-9, excl:l:ding the R.."'JP 
requirements. Ewn though the other systems have not specifically addressed integrity, 
CUrTl:nt trends in the re fi nement and development of RAIM algorithms is very 
cncouragmg. 
2. Differential CPS and DoD Requirements 
In addition to the technical requirements established by the Itt'.'p , the 000 places 
additional requirements on a preci~ion landing sy~tl:m. All of the OGPS systems 
evaluatl:d were capable of meeting or excl:l:ding thl: Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) 
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idmti11ed in Chapter [[] Pkase refi::r to Table 5.1 for an overview of DGPS systems 
ve rsus DoD requi rements 
Measures of Effectiveness Meeting 000 Requirements for each Scenario 
Fixed Base Tactical Clandestine Shipboard 
ircrafl Accident Rate YES YES YES YES 
Decision Height YES YES YES YES 
ime to A larm YES YES YES YES 
vailability YES YES YES TBD 
Number of Personnel YES YES YES YES 
requ ired to Operate System 
Number of Personnel YES YES YES YES 
required to Support System 
Preventative Maintenance YES YES YES YES 
ircrafl Capacity YES YES YES YES 
Coverage YES YES YES YES 
Range YES YES YES YES 
Probability of Detection NfA YES' YES' YES' 
Spoofability NfA YES' YES' YES' 
Effective Jamming Range NfA YES' YES' YES' 
Setup Time NfA YES YES NfA 
Sustainability NfA YES YES NfA 
Battery Power Operations NfA YES YES NfA 
Transportability NfA YES YES NfA 
~ , indicates evaluation was performed on an uncl~ssified basis, 
and further research based upon classified analysis IS required. 
3. General 
J"he adoption of a OOPS precision landing 'Nill meet the requirements identified in 
the DPALS. In addition, it will provide the pilot 'Nith virtually seamless navigation from 
departure to arrival. GPS technology is used extensively throughout the DoD and the 
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civilian world today. The demands on the logistics suppon system should be reduced by 
only having one system to suppon for all the services and the availability of GPS 
components already in the supply system 
B. RECOMMEN DATIONS 
I believe the robustness, ease of operation, and the fact that integer ambiguities do 
not have [0 be solved make the Ohio University and Wilcox systems the front runners and 
especially suited for tactical, shipboard, and clandestine operations. For fixed based 
operat ions, increased integrity may be a key concern. If this is the case and increased 
cost is not a major concern, then J believe a combination of Stanford's integrity beacons 
and the Ohio University or Wilcox system would be a perfect mix. The codc-based 
systems can easily provide up 10 Category II accuracy requirements to all runways 
(meeting almost all expected weather conditions), while providing excellent integrity, 
whereas the integrity beacons could be installed on the primary runway to provide 
Category III accuracy with greater integrity. 
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APPENDIX A. TROPOSPHERIC CORRECTIO," MODEL 
Using the J-[opficld mooel for altitude variation of the Index of Refraction, Black 
developed "An Easily Implemented Alogrilhm for the Tropospheric Range Correction" 
[Ref. 28J. Thc following equation is used to modelrropospheric range error correction' 
where Lls represents the tropospheric delay and ill d and ru" represents thc tropospheric 
delay due to "dry air" and "wet air" respectively. It should be noted that dry air 
contributes 90% ofthc total tropospheric delay. whereas. wet air contributes only 10% of 
the total tropospheric delay. Now rud and AY,.. are calculated using the following 
equations and constants: 
(35) t1sd ""' 2.343PL (r-~J2lJl(hd,E) 
(37) {(h,E) ~ 11_[ co,, , r V 1+( 1- 1<)" 
(38) r, =' 6378137 melers 
(39) p - j atmosphere 
(40) [-== 15° C 
(41) h ... 0; 13,000 melers 
(42) hd= 148.98(T-4.12)me/ers 
(43) Ie '"' 0.85 
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(44) k" = 0.2 
It should bt: undt:fstood that I, and K. are empirical (;onstants and the value of 0.85 
for I, is valid only for elevation angles (E) above five degrees. Furthermore, k.". has 
st:vcral t:mpiri(;al values with 0.2 being valid for spring and fall in the mid-latitudes. 
\'\/hen the elevation angle (E) is above 40" this model is practically exact. The worst error 
is approximalely 0.045 m and occurs when the elevation angle (E) is between 5 and 10 
degrees. The tropospheric error is the same for both levels of GPS service. 
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APPENUIX B. EXTENDED KAL\1AN FILTERING 
The GPS obscrvahle range is a nonlinear funct ion. Therefore we must look at how 
ihese I:o lincarities can be treated. The observation equations are given by: 
",d 
[n order to use a linear Iilter, these equations are ex.panded and only the firs t order 




(50) H. '" ~ Ix =X.~1H 
[t is important to deftne the state veClor~ and matrices. A state error vector is 
defined by X. = X* - Xl. and a predicted slate error vector is defined by 
X".w =Xk .. lik-X.,II.+I. The measurement noise covariance matrix is defined by 
R. = E[ v.· vi]. "Ibe covariance of the state eITor matrix is given by p. = ~ X •• x~ j. 
and the predicted covariance of the state error matrix i~ given by 
p •• 11K. = l{ X._ lll eX::!* ] [Ref. 29J. 
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In order to continue we need to identify some of the Kalman filter equations, which 
ar.;; given by the following : 
(54) X.\+II. 
It takes time for the GPS receiver to process the GPS signals and determine the 
observation Z;. We need to predict ahead in time so that real time infonnation is 
provided to the navigation equipment and the pilot. The Kalman filter uses a recursive 
linear algorithm to update a predicted Xt+ l/t. The Kalman filter requires an intial state, 
which is given by the following equation: 
(56) Xo = Zo 
After the initialization, X ..... I/h l is detennined by the following equation: 
(57) X'+II*+ I = Xk+J.'* + C[ Z.t+ [ - X.+II*J 
The gain matrix, G, is updated with every estimate. By allowing G to go to the 
extreme of zero, it can be seen that the new observation is completely ignored and that 
the estimation of the system state is simply the old prediction, "*Hlk. Whercas, if you 
let the gain matrix go to 1, the old prediction will cancel and only the observation, Z'+I, 
will be used. Therefore, the gain matrix is a gauge of the validity of the new 
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ml;.':asurl;.':mcnt. l\ow Xh l;, is the prediction of X at time k---l using all the infonnation 
availahle at time k. This prediction is based upon the following equation: 
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0 00 001 
Remember that the range observation equation is nonlinear for GPS in the states 
and is given by· 
(59) z. '" ~I .l;; + yZ +zZ 
lbe ob~ervation matrix, H, , can be derived using equation 51 yielding the 
fo llowing equation: 
[ -"- 0 -'-' 0 -'-' 0 1 (60) H k = ~ ~ J~ 
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This requires the observation matrix, H, to bl;.': calculated at I;.':ach measurement. 
However, b)' doing this. the recursive Kalman tilter equations have been extended to 
cover the nonlinear ease[Rcf. 29]. 
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